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I Articles I
Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign
Debt: Cuba and the IMF
Larry Catal Backer*
Abstract
This article examines two fundamentally different perspectives
when nation-states participate as creditors and debtors. The issue of
sovereign debt-its character and effect-is really part of the much
larger battle between two fundamentally opposed visions of the nature
and character of the nation-states in general, and debtor states in
particular, and of the global system that maintains the market for such
transactions. The dominant vision, firmly grounded in private law, posits
that growth can occur only in a tightly integrated global economy
founded on trade liberalization, privatization, and macrostability. When
* Copyright © 2005 Larry Catd Backer. Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State
University, Dickinson School of Law. The author can be contacted at lcb I I@psu.edu.
An earlier version of this article was presented for the panel on "The International
Monetary Fund, Debtor Nations and International Trade and Finance: New Issues,
Problems and Solutions," Second National People of Color Legal Scholarship
Conference, America, Race and Law at the Crossroads, The George Washington
University School of Law, Washington, D.C., Oct. 7, 2004. Special thanks to Welber
Barral (Universidad Federal de Santa Caterina, Brazil) for his review and for many
months of discussion of the issues raised here. The author's research assistant Pedro E.
Hernandez provided very able work on this project.
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the state fails to pay its debts, it ought to be treated like any other failed
corporate enterprise-a stay on debt collection efforts, broad
enforcement of absolute priority, creditor approval of the proposed
reorganization plan, and well protected new interim financing pending
restructuring. Opposing the dominant vision is an anti-corporatist
approach grounded in public law and the subordination of economics and
markets to political control in the furtherance of deliberate state public
policy and planning. States fail because it is in the interest of dominant
states to use sovereign debt as a means of perpetuating subordination and
a hierarchy of power among states. When a state fails to pay its debts,
the focus ought to be on the creditor, and the fairness of the debt in terms
of the larger public policy concerns--development, and the
maximization of living standards for all individuals through state
planning. The article first explores the normative foundations of each
vision and its consequences for dealing with the borrowings of nation-
states.
For this purpose the article concentrates on two actors who most
starkly highlight the opposing views. For the dominant vision focus is
on Anne Krueger, the First Deputy Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund, and specifically on her proposal to create a
bankruptcy model for sovereign state debt restructuring. For the
opposing vision the focus is on Fidel Castro Ruz, the President of the
Republic of Cuba, and specifically on his elaboration of a critique of the
dominant vision of global economic development championed by the
IMF. These actors nicely distill the positions subject to analysis in this
paper. The implications of each for the shape and character of
international regulation, and of the state as an actor in the context of the
emerging global system of economic and political regulation, are then
explored. In particular, this article contextualizes the Castro vision
within the developing positions of a number of public sector institutions,
from Latin American opposition to the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
to its use by the United Nations Human Rights establishment in Geneva
to regulate transnational corporations, to its use by non-state actors in the
West, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, to challenge, from within
the West, the market driven system elaborated through the IMF and well
illustrated by Krueger's proposal for a corporate bankruptcy style state
discipline overseen by international regulatory agencies.
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President Bush challenged Latin American leaders on Sunday to
choose between competing visions, one that would ensure social
justice through democracy and free enterprise and another that would
reverse progress by eroding democratic institutions and heightening
fear.... Bush said the plan he supports for the region would ensure
social justice through representative government, open markets and
"faith in the transformative power of freedom in individual lives.
The opposing vision, he said, "seeks to roll back the democratic
progress of the past two decades by playing to fear, pitting neighbor
against neighbor and blaming others for their own failures to provide
for their people.
The problem of sovereign debt-that is of the debt obligations of
nation-states when repayment becomes a problem-is generally
understood as a legal problem of contract,2 or as a regulatory problem
within a context of global markets for goods, services and capital
requiring some sort of disciplinary mechanism for states and their
creditors to ensure the integrity of markets.3 As a result, sovereign debt
could be understood as a specific iteration of a more general problem of
competition, investment and transactions in goods and services within an
emerging system of global trade in which states are facilitators of private
activity including foreign direct investment, dispute resolution, anti-
corruption measures, and the like.4 Most generally, perhaps, sovereign
debt is considered a political issue bound up in development generally
within the confines of the global trade system emerging since the 1970s.5
But the usual forms of discussion of the "problems" of sovereign
debt serve as proxy for a much more basic battle over much larger stakes.
As the initial quote suggests, global elites have come to understand that
1. Michael A. Fletcher, In Brazil, Bush Continues Trade Push, WASH. POST, Nov.
7, 2005, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/11/06/AR2005110600636.html(last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
2. For a very good example of this form of engagement with the sovereign debt
issue, see, e.g., William W. Bratton and G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the
Best Interests of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2004). For older analysis, see, e.g.,
Sarkis J. Khoury, Sovereign Debt: A Critical Look at the Causes and the Nature of the
Problem, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (1985).
3. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
145-148 (1990) (discussing sovereign debt, debt forgiveness and a legitimacy principle
for international law).
4. See, e.g., MICHEL HENRI BOUCHET, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
DEBT: WHO, WHAT, How MUCH, AND WHY? (1987); see also Jeremy Bulow, First World
Governments and Third World Debts, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 229
(2002).
5. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 48-63
(1999).
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two clear and opposed visions of the purpose, shape and character of the
modem state, and the state system have emerged since the end of the
Second World War. These differences rest on very different conceptions
of what sort of law ought to rule the relations among states, and the
importance of the public and moral obligations of the political
community. The dominant vision derives from what has sometimes been
called the "Washington Consensus." 6 This is the vision of developed
states, and public and private creditors. The foundation of this vision is
the private law of contract, the market and market integrity for trade and
for capital.7 This is a system of individual rational actors, of economics,
science and formulae. It assumes development is possible only through a
rigorous adherence to private property and free market principles, and
that markets lead to efficient outcomes.
Opposed to this view is one embraced by developing states,
especially those heavily indebted to creditor nations, significant elements
of civil society and elements of international institutions and religious
organizations. The foundation of this vision is public law and political
obligations of states over the economic imperatives of markets. This is a
view suspicious of markets and private actors. It sees development and
economics as public and political issues rather than private and economic
issues. It sees the world as a community of political collectives subject
to moral and ethical obligations of development imposed through an
emerging system of international law. This is a system of states and
other communal actors. This is a system in which economics is another
form of political expression, and where the fulfillment of moral
obligation is utility maximizing. It assumes development is possible
only by transfers of wealth from developed to developing states.
This article examines these two visions of the emerging regime of
lending to political sovereigns in the context of this battle for control of
the construction of globalization's grundnorms. For this purpose the
author focuses on two actors who most starkly highlight the two
6. "Fiscal austerity, privatization, and market liberalization were the three pillars of
Washington Consensus advice throughout the 1980s and 1990s." JOSEPH E. STIOGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 53 (2002).
7. "Market fundamentalism plays a crucial role in the global capitalist system....
Market fundamentalism came to dominate policy around 1980, when Ronald Reagan and
Margaret Thatcher came to power more or less simultaneously." GEORGE SOROS, THE
CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 128 (1998). The suggestion is that harmonization is being
driven by non-state actors within supra-national markets, and that these actors, within
these markets, are the most efficient source of the convergence of law and practice. "[A]
convergence of practices among important international civil society actors has led to a
rational uniformity of governance .... In other words, since the practices of international
banking, international trade, and communicating on the Internet are similar in different
states, the mechanism of governance of these practices has become similar." JARROD
WIENER, GLOBALIZATION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF LAW 10 (1999).
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opposing camps.8 For the emerging dominant vision based on markets
and private law, the author focuses on Anne Krueger of the International
Monetary Fund.9 For the articulation of the vision of those resisting or
opposing this emerging dominant view, the author focuses on Fidel
Castro, the leader of the Cuban State and its Communist Party.10
The article first examines the very different basis of each normative
framework within which the issue of sovereign debt and debt repayment
is articulated. For that purpose it focuses on a single work of Anne
Krueger and of Fidel Castro, each of which nicely distills the positions
subject to analysis in this article. First the dominant view in the context
of Anne Kruger's proposal for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
(SDRM) is examined, a sort of bankruptcy procedure for states, with the
objective of preserving asset values and protecting creditors' rights.1'
Then the article examines the critique of this dominant view and the
development of an alternative perspective in a speech delivered at the
8. It is clear that the ideological framework within which sovereign debt, and the
larger issue of globalization and market reforms, is debated, encompasses a broad
spectrum. Focusing on two of the actors in this vast and complex debate increases the
dangers of oversimplification and misrepresentation. Thus, for example, there is great
variation within those who consider themselves members of the "Washington Consensus"
camp. There is a tolerance for dissent and difference within this group. See, e.g.,
STIOGLITZ, supra note 6, at 101-135 (1998). But Krueger and Castro represent, in almost
pristine form, the differences at the core of the two great opposing camps-one
essentially private and market driven, the other public and state control driven. For the
purposes of this article, they serve to cast the debate in starkest form. That adds the
clarity necessary for analysis.
9. According to her biographical information posted at the IMF website, "Anne 0.
Krueger has been the First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund
since September 1, 2001. Before coming to the Fund, Ms. Krueger was the Herald L. and
Caroline L. Ritch Professor in Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics
at Stanford University. She was also the founding Director of Stanford's Center for
Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform; and a Senior Fellow of the
Hoover Institution." International Monetary Fund, Anne 0. Krueger, Biographical
Information, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/omd/bios/ak.htm (last visited
Mar. 15, 2006).
10. Since January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro has been the leader of the Republic of Cuba.
He has been a major actor in the international stage, projecting Cuban influence in the
1960s through the 1980s through aid to Marxist revolutionary movements throughout the
world. He has served as an influential force among various organizations of developing
and so-called non-aligned states. He has been tireless in popularizing his views through
speeches and other forms of public addresses. Collections of his public addresses have
been published. See, e.g., FIDEL CASTRO Ruz, DE SEATrLE AL 11 DE SEPTIEMBRE 185
(2002); FIDEL CASTRO Ruz, FIDEL CASTRO: SPEECHES 1984-85, WAR AND CRISIS IN THE
AMERICAS (1985). Among the many biographies of Castro, see, e.g., LEYCESTER
COLTMAN, THE REAL FIDEL CASTRO (2003).
11. Anne 0. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
International Monetary Fund, Apr. 30, 2002, available at
http://www.img.org/extemal/pubs.ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).
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University of Central Venezuela in 1999.12 Krueger's work illustrates
the dominant vision, firmly grounded in private law, and the
consequence of its positing that growth can occur only in a tightly
integrated global economy founded on trade liberalization, privatization,
and macrostability. When the state fails to pay its debts, it ought to be
treated like any other failed corporate enterprise-a stay on debt
collection efforts, broad enforcement of absolute priority, creditor
approval of the proposed reorganization plan, and well protected new
interim financing pending restructuring. Castro's work contextualizes
sovereign debt issues within an anti-corporatist approach grounded in
public law and the value of a command economy on an international
scale. The anti-corporatist vision posits that the current regime of
globalized financial markets produce rather than decrease poverty.
Sovereign debt has the effect of ceding sovereignty from borrower to
lender institutions. The dynamics of colonization reappear using the
coercive power of economic globalization rather than the troops of an
imperial power.
The article ends with a preliminary consideration of the great
underlying issue of sovereign debt-its implications for the shape and
character of international regulation, and of the state as an actor in the
context of the emerging global system of economic and political
regulation. These implications are most starkly drawn by the IMF and
Castro, each for its own side. The neo-liberal model underlying much of
modern globalization and its international systems vaunts markets and
market integrity over the niceties of a political order based on nation
states. "From the Greek loan of 1832 through the practices of the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development founded in 1990,
creditors have routinely compromised the domestic autonomy of weaker
lenders."1 3  The IMF system continues in that tradition through the
embrace of American ideology and interests generalized as a normative
system for global governance. Primary responsibility must fall on the
borrowing sovereign, as head of a borrowing community, who must be
controlled domestically by the political system that constrains debtor
governments. The opposing vision articulated by Castro presumes
economics is merely politics by other means; and that economics is
merely another means of exercising power. Such power must be used
12. Fidel Castro Ruz, Una revolucion solo puede ser hija de la cultura y sus ideas,
Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente del Consejo de Estado de la R~publica de Cuba,
Fidel Castro Ruz, en la Aula Magna de la Universidad Central de Venezuela, 3 Feb.
1999, available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobiemo/discursos/1999/esp/fO30299e.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2006) [hereinafter FCR 1999 Speech]. For the ease of the reader, the
English translation shall be used throughout the article.
13. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 161 (1999).
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directly for the benefit of individuals in accordance with political and
ideological formulae dear to the hearts of particular political
communities. Castro posits an inversion of that system without
loosening in any respect the control inherent in it. Primary responsibility
must fall on the lending creditor who must comply with a public law
code of ethics and obligations in lending. Obligation would flow from
and to creditor states-the framework would seek to serve the debtor
rather than the creditor for the purpose of remaking power relationships
among states. Castro's view is then contextualized within a globalization
discourse that rejects the IMF vision and finds expression both in
international political organizations-principally the United Nations-
and in global religious organizations-the positions of the Roman
Catholic Church.
One final introductory caution: Americans have obsessively
indulged in two traditions since Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba on
January 1, 1959. American political and economic institutions, the
Cuban Diaspora and many segments of American society, demonize
Fidel Castro, reducing him first to little more than the intellectual whore
of the Soviets and then caricaturing him as a shill for third world cynical
opportunism conflated with a sadly anachronistic Stalinist Marxist-
Leninist patina. 14  It is hard for this segment of Western society in
general, and Americans in particular, to see Castro as other than a proxy
for systems of governance and approaches to economic regulation
absolutely inimical to deeply held Western, and particularly American
traditions. 15 The American political left, on the other hand, has used
Castro and his revolution as a sort of poster child of the noble (Marxist-
Leninist) Third World savage valiantly battling the forces of reaction in
the United States, a battle undertaken within the United States by these
"vanguards" of change in the United States in its battles for political
dominance within the United States. 16 For the American left, it took
14. See Tomas Borge, El Nuevo Diario Interview with Fidel Castro: Blaming Stalin
For Everything Would Be Historical Simplism, EL NUEVO DIARIO, Managua, Nicaragua,
June 3, 1992, available at http://www.marxists.org/history/cuba/archive/castro/
1992/06/03.htm (Castro argued that Stalin "established unity in the Soviet Union. He
consolidated what Lenin had begun: party unity. He gave the international revolutionary
movement a new impetus. The USSR's industrialization was one of Stalin's wisest
actions, and I believe it was a determining factor in the USSR's capacity to resist."). Id.
15. For them only a total embargo of this contagion is appropriate. The United
States is not the only state with a taste for embargos as a means of political action. The
world community (or a large part of it) participated in a boycott of the apartheid regime
in South Africa until that government was toppled and replaced. Many majority Muslim
states have participated in a so-called Arab embargo of Israel. Hassan M. Fattah,
Kuwaitis Quietly Breach Taboo: Easing Hostility Toward Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2005, at A1O.
16. From early in the Revolution, this solidarity of the left was dramatized by
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nearly a generation to admit that, indeed, it was foolish to believe that
Castro could do no wrong, even when judged against the American left's
own moral and political value systems.
17
In a sense, Castro has mirrored that American obsession with an
obsession of his own-directed at the United States and all it appears to
stand for in his view. To some extent, this obsession colors Castro's
view of an international financial system dominated by the United
States.18 Nonetheless, Castro manages to articulate a sophisticated socio-
political theory of international relations. This theory, in its many forms,
and often stripped of its Marxist-Leninist patina, is influential outside of
the United States. In this sense, Castro serves as both influence and
convergence point for ideas in opposition to those derived from, or
supported by, the dominant global political establishment centered in the
United States. Even his enemies concede that "[f]or the past four
decades Fidel Castro and his regime have been the most vocal and active
proponents of anti-Americanism throughout the developing world. The
often-repeated view in many countries that the U.S. is an evil power,
guilty for much of the problems and sufferings of the poor nations, owes
legions of American youth flocking to help cut sugarcane in Cuba to help the Revolution
in the 1960s and 1970s-the so-called "Venceremos Brigades" that for a few years from
1969 on provided a means for American youth to travel to Cuba to aid in Castro's
revolutionary efforts. Until late in the 20'h century, the American left was quite willing to
excuse the excesses of Castro's Stalinist totalitarianism, his exportation of revolution and
his moral conservatism with respect to, for example, gay men and lesbians. See Ian Keith
Lekus, Queer Harvests: Homosexuality, the U.S. New Left, and the Venceremos Brigades
to Cuba, 89 RADICAL HIST. REV. 57-91 (2004).
17. Cases in point involved race and the response to AIDS. In both cases the Cuban
government implemented policies that, had they been attempted in the United States,
would have provoked a massive cry of human rights abuse. For a discussion, see, e.g.,
David W. Johnston, Cuba's Quarantine of AIDS victims, A Violation of Human Rights?,
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 189 (1992). And, of course, there is the matter of a free
press, one with respect to which the Cuban government and the American left have had
difficulty finding common ground. See, e.g., Inter American Press Association, Press
Freedom in the Americas Country by Country Reports, Cuba, (2005) available at
http://www.sipiapa.org/pulications/reportcuba2005.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have not been kind to Cuba on this score
in recent years. See, e.g., Sarah A. DeCrosse, Human Rights Watch, Cuba's Repressive
Machinery: Human Rights Forty Years After the Revolution, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/cuba (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
18. Jaime Suchlicki, Forward, in SELECTED STATEMENTS: 1958-2003 FIDEL CASTRO
ON THE UNITED STATES (Hans de Salas del Valle, ed., 2003) available at
http://www.neoliberalismo.com/salas_valle.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) ("Since
becoming the leader of Cuba, one of Castro's main objectives has been to undermine
U.S. power and prestige in the world. His support of anti-American guerrillas and
terrorists in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, his military involvement with and
support for anti-American regimes and groups in Africa and the Middle East in the 1970s
and 1980s, and his constant denunciations of 'U.S. imperialism,' 'capitalism,' and 'neo-
liberalism' in international organizations and forums attest to his determination and
consistency.").
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its power, in some respects, to the media efforts of Castro and his
officials." 19
Viewed in a broader context, what appear to be Castro's mere media
efforts against the United States might be more usefully understood as
symptomatic of a form of theorizing the purpose of which is to challenge
the currently dominant normative basis for global economic
organization-including the rules for regulating sovereign debt-that is
to a great extent influenced by American thinking. And perhaps it is
meant to challenge the United States itself. Castro's voice is one among
many. These ideas find their echo in the approach increasingly voiced
by organs of the United Nations human rights institutions in Geneva.2°
Shorn of Castro's overlay of overt anti-Americanism and
uncompromising anti-capitalism, the approach articulated by Castro finds
a parallel in the United Nations efforts to regulate corporate
governance, 2 1 as well as recent efforts to overhaul the structure of the
United Nations itself.22 It will likely serve as a basis, even if its source
remains unidentified, of resistance to the developing Western
institutional consensus relating to global governance in general, and to
the character of states and sovereign debt in particular. It has served as a
basis for resistance in Latin America to American efforts to institute a
regional trade zone-the Free Trade Area of the Americas.23 And it has
19. Id.
20. For that reason, among others, this institution has come under very heavy
criticism from the United States, and might well see its existence substantially changed
under proposals for modification of the United Nation's governance structure proposed at
the end of 2004. See Warren Hoge, UN Panel Proposes Sweeping Changes: Security
Council Would Grow to 24, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 2, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
12918822 ("'The panel was very critical of the Human Rights Commission, a body that
has often brought the United Nations into disrepute by incorporating some of the worst
rights violators like Cuba, Libya and Sudan into its membership. The commission, which
is based in Geneva, suffers from a credibility deficit that casts doubt on the overall
reputation of the United Nations,' the report said. The official who briefed reporters
added that too often the chief motivation for countries to join was to deflect attention
from deplorable rights conditions at home.").
21. For a discussion, see Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations,
Transnational Law: The United Nation's Norms of the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations as Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility as International Law, 37
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2005).
22. United Nations, Office of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary General of the
United Nations for Decision by the Heads of State and Government in September 2005,
Mar. 21, 2005, available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/. See also David Nason,
Annan Urges Radical Overhaul of UN, AUSTRALIAN (Mar. 22, 205), available at 2005
WLNR 4351609 ("Mr. Annan also called on developed nations to agree to a 2015
deadline for providing 0.7 percent of their gross domestic product for the fight against
poverty, and for urgent international agreement on new measures to fight terrorism and
nuclear proliferation.").
23. President Bush's visit to Mar del Plata in Argentina in October 2005 to promote
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produced popularly elected demagogues-Hugo Chavez in Venezuela
and Evo Morales in Bolivia.24
Castro's vision finds an equally important echo in the Catholic
social thought of the late 201h century.25 Since its rejection of so-called
liberation theology in the 1980s, 26 Catholic social thought has stressed
many of the objectives identified by Castro, and has criticized aspects of
market based globalization, and the resulting system of unsustainable
state debt, attacked by Castro. At the same time it embraced the form of
the critique, the Roman Catholic Church has been careful to reject what
it calls the secularism inherent in any form of Marxist-Leninist program
of opposition to market globalization.27 The Roman Catholic Church has
thus developed, under the leadership of John Paul II, an extensive
catalogue of criticism of the modem global market system that stressed
development and charity, within a Catholic context, that paralleled
Castro's opposition to neo-liberal globalization, within a Marxist-
Leninist context.28 Both understand sovereign debt as a piece of the
larger problem of the nature of the organization, and the character of the
normative structure, of the emerging global governance system. If for no
other reason, Castro's vision of global governance and sovereign debt is
worth extracting and considering.
I. The Dominant Vision: The United States, the International
Monetary Fund, the Market and the Supremacy of Private Law
The dominant vision is driven by nations representing the most
powerful economic powers. It is to a large extent facilitated by the great
financial instruments created after the Second World War, the
International Monetary Fund 29 and the World Bank.30 The Washington
progress on the Free Trade Area of the Americas, was a substantial failure. The
American efforts was met not only with official resistance at the conference but also with
extensively televised popular demonstrations in which much of the rhetoric of Castro
described in this paper was deployed against the Free Trade Area of the Americas. See
CITE.
24. At least one nationally syndicated American news commentator has greeted the
election of Evo Morales with some alarm and a certain amount of cynicism. See, e.g.,
Georgie Anne Geyer, History of Failure: Bolivia's New President Offers an Old Idea:
Socialism, THE PATRIOT NEWS, Dec. 28. 2005, at A1O.
25. For American academic application of the principles of Catholic social thought,
see, e.g., William P. Quigley, Prison Work, Wages, and Catholic Social Thought: Justice
Demands Decent Work for Decent Wages, Even for Prisoners, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1159, 1174 (2004).
26. See, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation (1986).
27. See id.
28. See discussion, infra at Part III.
29. "The IMF is an organization of 184 countries, working to foster global monetary
cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high
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Consensus posits that growth can occur only in a tightly integrated global
economy founded on trade liberalization, privatization, and
macrostability. Micro-stability will always come-in the long run. It
views regulatory institutions-like the nation-state-in much the same
way Enlightenment philosophes understood God-as the great
clockmaker whose function was limited to delineating the parameters
under which individuals could freely and fairly optimize their condition.
In the parlance of economic globalization, the state functions best as a
sort of ur- or meta-enterprise providing the stability through which
private ordering can fuel wealth, by reducing transaction costs and costs
of information, and by policing the system to ensure that all parties play
by the same set of aggregate wealth maximizing rules.
When private enterprises fail, they must be subject to reordering
under rules meant to minimize the risk of aggregate loss to the economic
communities within the state. Bankruptcy provides a means through
which private economic orderings can be reabsorbed into a functioning
economic system and used to maximum effect with as little disruption to
the economic system as possible. It provides the smallest protection to
the greatest risk takers-the shareholders, and greatest protection to
those whose risk, and also whose reward, was contractually limited-the
debt holders. Lenders must be paid, shareholders must bear the risk of
loss, and enterprises that might be viable ought to be able to continue to
produce wealth even as they are being reorganized. All of this
maximizes the aggregate wealth of all stakeholders in the system. For
this purpose, the political community-organized as a sort of meta-
corporation-serves as regulator, ensuring that wealth-creating capacity
is appropriately reabsorbed and again becomes productive.
But nation-states are not strangers to this market over segments of
which they preside. Political rather than purely economic aggregations,
states nonetheless participate as regulators of segments of the global
market. As regulatory bodies, nation-states, like corporations, must be
subject to some sort of discipline to ensure aggregate wealth
employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty." International
Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org. For a fairly complete self-description of the IMF
and its mission, see, http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
30. Like the IMF, the World Bank has a fairly comprehensive self-description that
parallels that of the IMF at some level of generality. "The World Bank Group's mission
is to fight poverty and improve the living standards of people in the developing world. It
is a development Bank which provides loans, policy advice, technical assistance and
knowledge sharing services to low and middle income countries to reduce poverty. The
Bank promotes growth to create jobs and to empower poor people to take advantage of
these opportunities." World Bank Group, About US, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410-
piPK:36602-theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). For more information
about the World Bank, see, e.g., http://www.worldbank.org.
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maximization. For this purpose states also serve a higher master. Each
state is bound by the rules of a community of states that together have
acquired an autonomous personality constituting all nation-states as a
singular body corporate. This international community is meant to be
superior to any of its constituent parts and is charged with providing
stability through which state ordering can fuel wealth for its citizens.
When the state fails to pay its own debts, it, too, ought to be treated like
any other failed enterprise and made subject to rehabilitation rules
imposed by the community of states and its financial instrumentalities.
Those rules have recently taken the form either of a strong
contractarianism, requiring implementation of the terms of sovereign
debt instruments, or of a state enterprise-type bankruptcy standard,
imposing a stay on debt collection efforts, broad enforcement of absolute
priority, creditor approval of the proposed reorganization plan, and well
protected new interim financing pending restructuring. The IMF has
recently suggested a more powerful implementation of the state
bankruptcy mechanism through Anne Krueger's proposal to create a
"Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism" in which the IMF would
serve as a sort of bankruptcy court for states.
Anne Krueger proposes a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
(SDRM) that aims to help preserve asset values and protect creditors'
rights, while paving the way toward an agreement that helps the debtor
return to viability and growth.31  The purpose of the proposal is
efficiency, and the maximization of the welfare of creditors and the
citizens of the overextended state:
The absence of a robust legal framework for sovereign debt
restructuring generates important costs. Sovereigns with
unsustainable debts often wait too long before they seek a
restructuring, leaving both their citizens and their creditors worse off.
And when sovereigns finally do opt for restructuring, the process is
more protracted than it needs to be and less predictable than creditors
would like.
32
The basis for this approach is contract; 33 the model is corporate
bankruptcy. "This approach draws on the principles of well-designed
corporate bankruptcy regimes, and is similar in concept to the decision-
31. Krueger, supra note 11.
32. Id. at 39.
33. Id. at 29-32. Krueger notes two significant problems with a wholly contractual
basis for sovereign debt programs. "First, it would be difficult to establish a purely
contract based framework." Id. at 30. "Second, even if a contract-based framework
could be established, it would not provide a comprehensive and durable solution to
collective action problems." Id. at 31. To overcome these limitations of contract, she
suggests a statutory regime based on domestic and international law. Id. at 31-33.
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making procedures among holders of a single bond issue that contains a
majority restructuring clause.34 Most useful is the already developed for
municipalities under American law.
35
SDRM is designed to create incentives for a debtor with
unsustainable debts to approach its creditors promptly-and preferably
before it interrupts its payments. But it should also avoid creating
incentives for countries with sustainable debts to suspend payments
rather than make necessary adjustments to their economic policies. 36 In
addition, Krueger's proposal calls for the resort to SDRM at the instance
of the debtor country; and not for the IMF or creditors to impose.37 More
importantly, "the mechanism would be implemented when the
mechanism would be invoked where there is no feasible set of
sustainable macroeconomic policies that would enable the debtor to
resolve the immediate crisis and restore medium-term viability unless
they were accompanied by a significant reduction in the net present value
of the sovereign's debt."38 In other words, it would be a last resort.
Krueger argues that there are two key challenges to the successful
design and implementation of an SDRM. One is to create incentives for
debtors with unsustainable debt burdens to address their problems
promptly in a manner that preserves asset values and paves the way
toward a restoration of sustainability and growth, while avoiding the
creation of incentives for the misuse of the mechanism. The other is to
design the mechanism so that, once activated, the relative roles assigned
to the sovereign debtor and its creditors create incentives for all parties to
reach rapid agreement on restructuring terms that are consistent with a
return to sustainability and growth.39 For that purpose SDRM must have
four key elements, consistent with a pattern from out of corporate
practice: majority restructuring, 40 a stay on creditor enforcement, 41 and
protection of creditor interests,42 and priority financing.4 3 With these key
34. Id. at 39.
35. Id. at 12-14.
36. Id.
37. Krueger, supra note 11, at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id. at5.
40. Id. at 14-15 ("The creation of a mechanism that would enable the affirmative
vote of a qualified majority of creditors to bind a dissenting minority to the terms of a
restructuring agreement would be the most important element of any new restructuring
framework.").
41. Id. at 15-16 ("In the event that an agreement had not been reached prior to a
default, a temporary stay on creditor litigation after a suspension of payments but before
a restructuring agreement is reached would support the effective operation of the majority
restructuring provision.").
42. Id. at 16-17 ("An SDRM would need to include safeguards that give creditors
adequate assurances that their interests were being protected during the period of the stay.
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elements in place the real value of the SDRM is more clearly revealed-
a method for enhancing the value of sovereign debt as an asset class, and
therefore the willingness of the lender class to make additional loans
with less onerous conditions.4
Krueger then asks the question: What role should the IMF play in
the actual operation of the mechanism? 45 The answer, Krueger asserts, is
inherent in the IMF's current role and authority within the framework of
international finance.46 In effect, a formal SDRM structure merely
institutionalizes the role the IMF has fashioned for itself in connection
with sovereign debt difficulties.47 She points out that the main concern
would be that the IMF as a creditor and as an institution, whose members
include debtors and bilateral official creditors, would not be perceived as
being entirely impartial in exercising this authority.48 However, Krueger
proposes a number of administrative procedures to ensure a minimization
of conflict and the maximization of the implementation of the will of the
majority of creditors.49  The IMF would rely on its existing financial
These safeguards would have two complementary elements. First, the sovereign debtor
would be required not to make payments to nonpriority creditors. Second, there would
have to be assurances that the debtor would conduct policies in a fashion that preserves
asset values."). Assurances could be most efficiently provided through the IMF. Id. at
16-17.
43. Kreuger, supra note 11, at 17. ("A majority restructuring mechanism could also
usefully be buttressed by a mechanism that would facilitate the provision of new money
from private creditors during the period of the stay. It is in the collective interests of
private creditors and the sovereign debtor that new money be provided in appropriate
amounts. Such financing, when used in the context of good policies, can help limit the
degree of economic dislocation and thereby help preserve the member's capacity to
generate the resources for meeting debt-service obligations." Id.).
44. "More generally, to the extent that the establishment of a sovereign debt
restructuring framework serves to create a more structured negotiating framework
between creditors and sovereign debtors, it may enhance the value of sovereign debt as
an asset class." Id. at 20.
45. Id. at 21-28.
46. Id. at 21.
47. Id. at 20-22. Specifically, Krueger sees the IMF's involvement as most effective
in three key areas:
First, activation of a stay on creditor action would require a request by the
sovereign debtor and IMF endorsement. Such endorsement would be based on
the IMF's determination that the member's debt is unsustainable and that
appropriate policies are being-or will soon be-implemented. Second, any
extension of the stay would require a determination by the IMF not only that
adequate policies continue to be implemented but also that the member is
making progress in its negotiations with its creditors. Third, IMF approval of a
restructuring agreement that had been accepted by the requisite majority of
creditors would be a condition for its effectiveness. Such approval would be
based on a determination that it provides for a sustainable debt profile.
Id. at23.
48. Krueger, supra note 11, at 24-29.
49. Id. at 23-28.
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powers to create the incentives for the relevant parties to use the
mechanism appropriately.50 In addition, provision would be made for the
preservation of the domestic banking and capital finance system. In
particular, the possible tradeoff between the magnitude of debt reduction
obtained through a restructuring, on the one hand, and the prospect that
the sovereign will be able to mobilize savings from domestic capital
markets in the aftermath of a restructuring-particularly in the period
while access to international capital markets will likely remain closed.51
Krueger considers a number of different approaches to creating a
legal framework for institutionalizing this system. 2 She considers
contract as a basis for implementing the framework5 3 Another approach
is grounded in statutory requirements. A statutory framework could
cover a broad range of debt, including domestic debt. An alternative
approach would exclude domestic debt from the scope of the statutory
approach and rely instead on the existing governing legal frameworks to
facilitate any required restructurings of these claims. The framework
would address collective action problems that to date have made the cost
of restructuring excessively high for both debtors and creditors.5 4
If a statutory approach that creates the legal basis for majority
action across all sovereign indebtedness offers the best method of
achieving the objectives of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, the
question arises as to how best to implement a change in the statutory
regime." The final section of the proposal considers these issues. In this
final section, Krueger discusses the difficulties of implementation given
the present state of domestic, international, and transnational legal
regimes. She rejects the idea of harmonization of domestic law in favor
of adopting a binding treaty regime grounded in changes in the
constitution of the IMF. 6
50. Id. at 24-29.
51. Id. 18-19.
52. Id. at 29.
53. Krueger, supra note 11, at 29-33.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 29. Krueger offers several reasons in support of this approach:
First, it would prevent circumvention: if the statutory framework is only in
place in a limited number of jurisdictions, creditors could ensure that future
instruments enable them to enforce their claims in jurisdictions that have not
adopted such jurisdictions but whose money judgments are recognized in under
treaties or local law. Second, an international treaty would ensure both
uniformity of text and, if there is an institution given interpretive authority,
uniformity of interpretation. Third, it would address a potential "free rider"
problem: without a treaty, countries would be reluctant to adopt legislation until
they were assured other countries had also done so. Finally, the establishment
of a treaty facilitates the establishment of a single international judicial entity
that would have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes that would arise
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The policy concerns underlying the plan are fairly simple to
summarize. These concerns include: preservation of financial markets
for capital, conflation of nation-state and corporation on a nexus of
contract model, with due regard for differences between a subordinate
economic entity (a corporation), a subordinate political entity (a
municipality), and a nation-state. But for all of that regard, the focus
remains on the debt and the market facilitating that debt. The state's
highest priority is to preserve its credit, and its ability to acquire more
debt on advantageous terms. The great difficulty is the collective action
problem among sovereign state creditors.57 The goal is economic
stability, well functioning markets, and the creation of wealth that
ultimately will seep down to all levels of social organization. Prosperity
and development hinge on wealth creation through markets facilitated by
loan and equity capital available on the most advantageous terms
possible.
Krueger's proposal is one of many coming from the United States,
and represents among the most well articulated statements of the current
position of developed countries and the international financial
establishment. All proposals would treat the state as a form of super,
hyper, or special-form corporation, ultimately subject to a set of greater,
58third-party or supra-national sovereigns. In the case of Krueger's type
of proposal, the ultimate sovereign to be designated would be one or
another set of international institutions, like the IMF. 59 In other cases,
the third-party could be chosen by the sovereign and creditors, or by
others.60 In either case, the nature of the sovereign debt transaction
between the debtor and its domestic and international creditors and among such
creditors.
Id. at 33-34.
57. Id. at 2.
58. To a significant extent, the difference is inherent in differences between
economic and political communities. Corporations, and even municipalities, might be
dissolved, and the interests of residuary owners dispersed or transferred to those with a
higher interest. Where the residuaries are citizens of a state, those solutions are less
likely to be either possible or palatable. The special nature of allocation of risk for state
debt repayment failures to its "equity holders"--its citizens and local enterprises-
provides both opportunity and risk for creditors. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton, Toward a
Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons From Corporate
Bankruptcy Practice Around the World, IMF Staff Papers No. 41, Jan. 1, 2003, available
at 2003 WL 56959225.
59. Thus, for example, Bolton notes, and not inaccurately from the perspective of the
Washington consensus, that in the context of sovereign debt, the "IMF has a special role
to play that has no counterpart in the corporate context, except perhaps the relationship
banking role played by a corporation's main bank." Id. at 18.
60. For a penetrating analysis of this sort, see, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, A
Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 997(2004).
Professor Dickerson's thesis is that:
[A] politically viable approach to resolving sovereign debt crises is to develop a
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retains its character as a private rather than a public transaction, subject
by analogy, and with due regard to the slight differences between
economic and political "corporations," to domestic bankruptcy law
models.
61
These approaches focus on the state as autonomous entities, and on
lenders as subjects of equal dignity under the leveling principles of
contract law. The aim is to preserve the flow of funds into sovereign
states as debt, and out of sovereign states as interest and repayment of
principal. The more regularized the flow, the more stable the political
environment in which transnational markets may flourish, business may
grow and people will prosper. Prosperity provides the basis for stable
political relationships, and maybe even for democracy; control in the
name of political aims is inimical to freedom and to the ultimate best
interests of any political community.
62
Even when states cannot immediately pay their debts, a
debtor/creditor environment that maximizes incentives to continue
lending during any period of sovereign insolvency provides the optimal
basis for market expansion within a framework of global capital flows in
which states play a critical role. From this perspective, protection of the
global creditor class, now consisting of a widely dispersed and varied
group of individuals and entities, becomes the key to world economic
stability as well as a source of trouble for dealing with defaulting states.63
flexible statutory framework that encourages sovereigns to activate early
restructurings. To give sovereigns such incentives, the IMF should condition
future lending on sovereigns' willingness to enact basic mandatory debt
restructuring procedures. While sovereigns should be encouraged to enact
comprehensive debt restructuring legislation, they should be allowed to
customize their debt restructuring procedures by negotiating a private written
"protocol" with their creditors. If the sovereign and its creditors are unable to
reach agreement on the protocol before the sovereign activates the mandatory
debt restructuring provisions (including a brief standstill and stay on
enforcement actions), the restructuring initially should be governed by paired
pro-debtor and pro-creditor default terms selected by a neutral third-party
entity.
Id. at 997-98.
61. For an excellent example of the genre, see Bolton, supra note 58, at 15-18; 22-
25.
62. See George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html. President Bush suggested that
democracy and human dignity provide a framework limiting the power of any political
community-nation, state, international organization, etc.-to organize its society. He
also noted that every nation has the right to choose its own path to freedom and
democracy, and every other state has the authority to help its neighbors achieve and
maintain compliance with these standards.
63. Horst Kbhler, Opening Remarks for the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism Conference (Jan. 22, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/2003/012203.htm. ("Twenty years ago, when sovereign debt consisted mainly
of syndicated bank loans, a debt restructuring-while never pleasant-was relatively
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The intellectual battle lines, then, are drawn around the rights of
creditors, and the smoothness of restructuring debt transactions to ease
and rapidity of resumption of lending and repayment patterns, rather than
anything else.
64
At a greater level of generality, the focus of this these proposals is
essentially economic, rather than social or political. The normative basis
of regulation is the private contractual relation, not the public or political
transaction. The regulatory framework is the market instead of the
political community. Indeed, the effect of political considerations, to the
extent they detract from efficiency, can be viewed as politically wrong if
the object is the long-term stability and prosperity of state debtors and
their citizens. Even the IMF itself is subject to criticism for what is
sometimes deemed the importation of extraneous, political,
considerations in matters affecting the debt of sovereigns. For example,
some have observed that:
In theory, these loans are conditional, requiring the sovereign
to reform its economic policies and the unpaid creditors to
share the pain by cutting back their claims to induce lending
that facilitates economic recovery. In practice, the IMF often
acts precipitously, bailing out the sovereign so as to stabilize
the international financial system or satisfy some other political
goal of its major shareholders.65
Thus, the objective with the greatest value appears to be the
development and maintenance of a mechanism through which the state
can correct its failures and resume its role as an Enlightenment deity, as
clock maker while protecting the market for private and public debt, and
while maximizing protection of creditor (states and institutions). As the
managing director of the IMF recently reminded an audience at a
conference of sovereign debt restructuring: "Globalization offers many
opportunities, and integration in the world economy is surely the most
potent instrument for poverty alleviation. But we need to invest in
globalization to ensure that its opportunities are more widely shared and
straight-forward. But today, the market is characterized by an enormous diversity of debt
instruments and a multiplicity of creditors. Argentina alone has some 700,000 retail
creditors! As a result, debt restructuring has become much more complex." Id.).
64. See William W. Bratton and G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the
Best Interests of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2004) (discussing harm to creditors, and
credit markets for states, of proposals that seek to treat sovereign debt as debt guaranteed
by international financial establishment (in opposition to the current regime of strict
contractarianism and its more flexible alternative-swapping (either mandatory or
permissive) because it does not preserve all of the creditors' rights (but contemplates the
possibility of changes in terms) without the consent of every creditor).
65. Id. at 3.
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that its risks are contained.,
66
II. Fidel Castro, the State, and Global Cycles of Permanent
Subordination Through Debt
Opposing the dominant vision is an anti-corporatist vision
articulated by Fidel Castro. Cuba is the idea place for the development
of a normative system of global finance opposing the system developed
under the influence of the Washington Consensus. The United States
and Cuba have been bitter political and cultural rivals almost from the
inception of the success of the Cuban Revolution on January 1, 1959.
The United States has imposed a near-total embargo on Cuba since the
early 1960s.67 A significant focus of the embargo is on Cuban goods and
raw materials.68 For purposes of this article, however, the financial
embargo is even more important to the development of Castro's ideas.
The United States has sought to cut Cuba off from all sources of global
finance. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies that goal
had been difficult to achieve because of the steady support of the Soviet
66. See generally K6hler, supra note 63.
67. For a discussion of the Cuban embargo, see, e.g., PATRICK J. HANEY, THE
DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (2005), JAIME SUCHLICKI, THE
U.S. EMBARGO OF CUBA (2000); ADOLFO LEYVA DE VARONA, PROPAGANDA AND
REALITY, A LOOK AT THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CASTRO'S CUBA (1994). A number of
pro-embargo web sites also provide a tremendous amount of information. See, e.g.,
http://www.hermanos.org (Brothers to the Rescue Website) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006),
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/default.htm (Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies,
University of Miami Cuba Transition Project Website) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006),
http://www.cubacenter.org/ (Center for a Free Cuba website) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
For the embargo from the Cuban perspective, see http://www.cubavsbloqueo.cu/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2006).
68. The American blockage effectively embargos most transactions with or travel to
Cuba without the permission of the federal government. Among the laws which facilitate
this embargo are: (1) Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. appx. 5 et seq.,
(under which the President may limit trade with an enemy nation during times of war or
peace, and under which American Presidents issue annual reports on the Cuban state of
emergency); (2) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq. (pursuant to
which aid is provided to nations other than Cuba, which is expressly excluded from its
provision as long as Cuba retains a Marxist-Leninist government); (3) Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq. (under which foreign aid is promised to Cuba once
the Marxist-Leninist government is removed); and(4) Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1995, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (under which third country
investment in Cuba is discouraged, democratic reform in Cuba is encouraged, an
assistance plan if transition to market economy occurs is proposed, the property rights of
U.S. nationals are protected, and all prior federal regulations involving Cuba are
codified). Under regulations implementing the Trading With the Enemy Act, all
unlicensed financial and commercial transactions by Americans with Cuba or Cuban
citizens is prohibited, Cuban assets of Cuba in the United States are frozen, remittances to
Cuban citizens limited, and travel to and expenditure of money in Cuba is prohibited.
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, it has been much
easier for the United States to cut Cuba off from international capital.70
First, American law requires the Secretary of the Treasury to "instruct
the United States executive director of each international financial
institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the
admission of Cuba.",71  Second, the United States has aggressively
pressured international lending institutions to avoid lending to Cuba.72
However, the United States is not entirely to blame for Cuba's poor
credit situation. Cuba's inability to resolve payment issues relating to its
enormous debt to the Soviet Union, which is now owed to the nations
succeeding the Soviet Union, as well as its aggressive ideologically-
based embrace of default, as a justifiable strategy for interaction with
international debtors,73 has also contributed to its poor credit worthiness
in the eyes of the international financial community. Taken together,
69. This produced a massive debt held first by the Soviet Union and then by the
states that emerged out of its collapse. For a discussion of the nature of the Soviet
Union's economic support of Cuba until the early 1990s, see, e.g., Carmelo Mesa-Lago,
The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001: Evaluation of Performance and Debate on the
Future, in 11 CUBA IN TRANSITION 1, 4 (2001).
70. Recently, however, the People's Republic of China has been more active in
cultivating Cuba. But is unclear, however, the extent to which this friendship will serve
as an effective counterweight to American plans for Cuba. See, e.g., Larry Catd Backer,
Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: Cuban Marxism: Private Economic
Collectives and Free Market Globalism, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337,
404-13 (2004).
71. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 69A), at 22 U.S.C. § 6034(a)(1) (2000)
(Helms Burton Act). For an American perspective report on the success of the Helms
Burton Act, see Paolo Spadoni, The Impact of the Helms-Burton Legislation on Foreign
Investment in Cuba, in 11 CUBA IN TRANSITION 18 (2001).
72. In addition, U.S. law requires U.S. contributions to specific international
organizations-the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the
International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency, and the
Inter-American Development Bank-to be reduced to any amount granted by these
institutions to Cuba. 22 U.S.C. § 6034(b) (2000).
73. The U.S. State Department reports that:
The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and
does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the
World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to
finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11
billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment,
interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic
delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit
rating to Caal--"speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba
as "one of the riskiest economies in the world."
See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: CUBA, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
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these problems contribute to a difficult position for Cuba on the global
economic stage. Recently, however, this American control of Cuba's
access to finance (but not the financial markets) has been threatened by
the growing interest of the People's Republic of China in Cuba.74 Still,
Cuba remains substantially isolated from the world economic community
and the system developed for economic interactions since the 1950s.
Castro's vision has been developing slowly over the last thirty
years. Its essence is an anti-corporatist vision that posits that the current
regime of globalized financial markets produce rather than decrease
poverty because the system is structured to inequitably favor creditors
over borrowers. The economic overlay of the current system masks its
political realities: sovereign debt has the effect of ceding a certain
amount of sovereignty from the borrower to the lender and its
instrumentalities. As a consequence, globalized capital markets are
actually slave markets of sorts-where wealthy states purchase rights to
control borrower states, and to remake them to suit the needs and
preferences of the lending states. The purpose of ownership is not crude
dominance in the manner of 1 9 th century imperialism, but to provide
expanded access to capital and labor, suppliers and customers, for the
economic activities of the controlling states and their economic "running
dogs." But for Castro the effect is the same.
The bulk of the substance of Castro's ideas has been developed
through speeches delivered in various venues within Cuba and abroad.
While many of them have been translated into other languages and
uploaded onto the Cuban government's official websites, 75 a number
have not. A number of American institutions also maintain collections of
speeches and other communications.76 With respect to the emerging
74. The Cuba Transition Project website reported that as of the end of 2004, China
was the sixth largest hard currency lender to the Republic of Cuba. See Cuba Transition
Project, Cuba Facts, Issue 8, Feb. 2005, available at http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/
FACTSWeb/Cuba%20Facts%20Issue%208%20February%202005.htm (reporting a
debt of $682 million as of December 2004) (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). It cited the
following sources as well: Mark Frank, China's Cuba Business Takes Big Leap Forward,
Havana, Reuters, Apr. 11, 2001 (which cites a US$210 loan granted in 2000); BBC
News, China To Lend Cuba $400m, Havana, Apr. 13, 2001; China Offer 400 Million
Dollars In Loans To Cuba, Beijing, People's Daily, Apr. 14, 2001. In addition, the Bank
of Shanghai provided a loan in 2002 to a state-owned Sino-Cuban joint venture for
construction of hotels in Havana and Shanghai. Cf. Feliberto Carri6, El Banco de
Shanghai concede a Cuba un cr~dito por 72 millones de d6lares para la construcci6n de
un hotel, EUROPA PRESS, Havana, Oct. 4, 2004. Id. at n.6.
75. See Discursos e intervenciones del Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz,
Presidente del Consejo de Estado de la Rep zblica de Cuba.
http://www.cuba.cu/gobiemo/discursos/index.html#fl30502 (incomplete database of
speeches from 1959-2005) (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
76. See, e.g., University of Texas Castro Speech Database, available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html (database contains English translations of
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international financial system centering on the IMF, Castro's vision has
found its most complete expression in a speech delivered at the
University of Central Venezuela in 1999.77 This speech provides the
basis for his understanding of "the disasters that the god of the market, its
laws and principles, and the formulas of the International Monetary Fund
and other global neocolonizing and recolonizing institutions
recommended to and imposed on practically every country, has
occasioned.,7 8 That speech forms the basis of this section, supplemented
by other speeches that are publicly circulated.
Castro starts by arguing that the current global economic system, of
which state debt forms merely an integrated part, cannot be understood
without first acknowledging the basic political context in which it has
developed. One must start, he suggests, with the reality of a single
thousands of speeches, interviews, and press conferences given by Fidel Castro between
1959 and 1996) (last visited Feb. 27, 2006); Marxists.org History Archive, Fidel Castro
History Archive, available at http://www.marxists.org/history/cuba/archive/castro (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
77. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12.
I synthesize my essential ideas: what I think about neoliberal globalization, the
absolute insustainability, socially and ecologically, of the currently imposed
economic order, the origin of production and accelerated development of
science and technology, it temporal character and its inevitable disappearance
by operation of the laws of history, the swindle on the world and inconceivable
privileges usurped by the United States, special emphasis on the value of ideas,
demoralization and uncertainty of that system, tactics and strategies of
resistance, probable course of the course of events, and great confidence in the
human capacity for survival.
Id. at 3. ("Expres6, en sintesis, mis ideas esenciales: lo que pienso de la globalizaci6n
neoliberal; lo absolutamente insostenible, social y ecol6gicamente, del orden econ6mico
impuesto a la humanidad; el origen de las fuerzas productivas y el desarrollo acelerado de
la ciencia y la trcnica; su cardcter temporal; la estafa al mundo y los inconcebibles
privilegios usurpados por Estados Unidos; 6mfasis especial en el valor de las ideas;
desmoralizaci6n e incertidumbre de los te6ricos del sistema; tActicas y estrategias de
lucha; curso probable de los contecimientos; confianza plena en la capacidad humana
para sobrevivir.").
78. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 18 ("[Tlenemos una idea, a nuestro juicio,
bastante clara de los desastres que el dios del Mercado, sus leyes y principios, y las
recetas del Fondo Monetario International y demds instituciones neocolonizadoras o
recolonizadoras del planeta, recomendaddas e impuestas pricticamente a todos los paises,
han ocasionado."). This is a long held view. A 1987 speech of Castro's uses similar
language to describe plans by the IMF to lend money to privatize state owned industries.
Castro asserted that the consequence of these plans was to "advocate the worst form of
neocolonialism and the renunciation on the part of the state of the propriety of these state
owned businesses. The IMF doesn't predict that privatized business will be better run,
not just simply that they be transferred to private hands." Fidel Castro Ruz, Discurso
pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz, Primer Secretario del Comit6
Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba y Presidente de los Consejos de Estado y de
Ministros, en la clausura de la VIII Conferencia de la Asociaci6n Americana de Juristas,
celebrada en el Palacio de las Convenciones, Sept. 17, 1987, available at
http://wwwl.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
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hegemonic power, the United States, seeking to reshape the world in its
image. 79 The United State's battle with Cuba reflects, in microcosm, its
struggle for dominance on a global scale, first dominated by its physical
aspects, and lately dominated by its ideological dimensions.
80
Indeed, the struggle over American power now extends globally,
and is dominated not by physical, but rather ideological aspects. 81 For
Castro, the consequence is clear: the battle against hegemony and
subordination cannot be conceived in its old form as a liberation struggle
by individual peoples, but must instead be understood that it manifests
itself as a global struggle 82 against the "dominion of an enormous
superpower. ' '83 "For this what is needed are not nuclear weapons or
great wars; what is needed are ideas. 84
Globalization, is thus better conceived as a manifestation of the
struggle for hegemony and subordination. As such, it constitutes a
particular set of ideas deployed in the service of the singular hegemonic
85power. That deployment is based almost exclusively on the
methodology of the carrot and the stick, both of which are monopolized
by the United States as a great hegemonic power (though, frankly any
79. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States "remained the
only superpower in a unipolar world, without rivals in the political, economic, military,
technological and cultural fields." FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 6 ("y aquel
vecino qued6 como iOnica superpotencia en un mundo unipoplar, sin rival en el terreno
poitico, econ6mico, military, technol6gico y cultural.").
80. "[N]onetheless, the battlefield is not our little island, though there is struggle on
this little island. Today the battlefield is the world." Id. at 9 ("sin embargo, el campo de
batalla no es nuestra islita, aunque en la islita hay que luchar. El campo de batalla hoy es
el mundo.").
81. "A more difficult battle has been necessary to free and will be necessary to
continue freeing us from that very powerful empire, the ideology that incessantly there is
no hope, which will be intensified with all their resources after the collapse of the
socialist regime." Id. at 6 ("Una batalla mds dificil ha sido necesario librar y habrd que
seguir librando contra ese poderosisimo imperio, es la luch ideological que
incesantemente ha tenmido lugar y que ellos arreciaron con todos sus recursos much m~is
despus del derrumbe del campo socialista.").
82. "It is not today that a town exists to free, today it is not a town that we must
save; but today there is a world, today there is a humanity for us to free and to save, and
that is our task, that is the task of you." Id. at 7 ("Es que hoy no existe un pueblo para
liberar, hoy no existe un pueblo para salvar; hoy hay un mundo, hoy hay una humanidad
opor liberar y salvar, y esa es la tarea nuestra, es la tarea de ustedes.").
83. Id. ("hoy tememos al mundo y a la humanidad bajo el dominio de una enorme
superpotencia.").
84. Id. ("Para ello lo que necesita no son armas nucleares ni grandes guerras; lo que
necesita son ideas.").
85. Castro, of course, posits this set of circumstances as inevitable within the
normative framework of Marxist determinism. "Globalization is a law of history, its
follows from the circumstances of the development of productive forces." Id. at 8 ("La
globalizaci6n es una ley hist6rica, es una circumstancia del desarrollo de las fuerzas
productivas.").
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hegemon would due for purposes of the application of this theory, even
Cuba) and naturalized as the inevitable working of a neutral system
based on natural principles.86 The engine of globalization is the
normative framework provided by what Castro calls "neoliberalism."
"Moreover, it is about a globalized world, really globalized, a world
dominated by the ideology, norms and principles of neoliberal
globalization., 87  Neo-liberalism is not an idea or system that can be
separated out from the power which seeks to use it for its own purposes.
Though it may masquerade as a neutral system free of any national
political agenda, it is neither neutral nor a-political.88
Instead, neoliberalism as a basis for globalization of the kind
advanced by the United States since 1945 masks a very specific set of
political aims. First, it seeks to convert all countries, but especially
developing states, into a vast private property sphere.89 In part, this has
been done, according to Castro, through the miracle of converting gold
into paper-that is of building an international financial system on the
basis of confidence in foundational global currencies-principally the
U.S. dollar.90 Within this sphere everything is for sale.91 Labor is for
86. "There are those who can be confused, and they are confused, or softened, or
weakened by the combination of economic difficulties, material privation, the exhibition
of the luxuries available in the consumer societies, and the rotten ideas well inculcated
about the fabulous advantages of their economic system, following that small minded
principle that humans are little animals who can only be moved when a carrot is put in
front of them or when they are beaten with a whip." FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at
9 ("Existen los que pueden ser confundidos, y lo son, o reblandecidos, o debilitados con
la mezcla de las dificultades econ6micas, las privaciones materials, la exhibici6n del lujo
de las sociedades de consumo y las podridas ideas bien edulcoradas sobra las fabulosas
ventajas de su sysema econ6mico, a partir del mezquizo criterio de que el hombre es un
animalito que solo se mueve cuando le ponen delante una zanahoria o le golpean con un
ldtigo. Sobre esa base ellos apoyan toda su estrategia ideological[.]).
87. Id. ("Ademds se trata de un mundo globalizado, realmente globalizado, un
mundo dominado por la ideologia, las normas y los principios de la globalizaci6n
neoliberal.").
88. This notion has found its supporters among Western legal academics. See, e.g.,
Uggo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study of U.S. Hegemony and the Latin
Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 383 (2002).
89. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 11 ("The neoliberal globalization wants to
convert all countries, especially our country, into a private property state." Id.) ("La
globalizaci6n neoliberal quiere convertir a todos los paises, especialmente a todos
nuestros paises, en propriedades privadas.").
90. Id. ("[T]hey have accumulated vast wealth by working that miracle to which the
alchemists of the Middle Ages aspired, of converting paper into gold, they were even
capable of turning gold into paper." Id.) ("ellos... han acumulando inmensas
riquezas... obrando el milagro al que aspiraron los alquimistas de la edad media,
convertir el papel en oro, a la vez fueron capaces de convertir el oro en papel.").
91. Id. ("They buy natural resources, factories, communication systems, services,
etc. etc. They even buy [our] land, thinking that because they are cheaper than land in
their own countries, they might make a good investment for the future." Id.) ("Compran
recursos naturals, fdibricas, sistemas completos de comunicaciones, servicios, etcetera,
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sale.92  Even states may be for sale.93  This idea, long expressed by
Castro,94 also finds expression in Western academic writing.9
Second, within this vast private market, neoliberalism aims to
convert all nation-states into a giant free trade zone.96 Not just any kind
of free trade zone, however, but one with "special characteristics, where
taxes are not paid, where raw materials, parts, [and] components can be
assembled or various products produced, especially with respect to those
endeavors requiring abundant cheap labor to produce for salaries often
no higher than 5% of that paid in the producers' home countries, and the
only thing left [after production] are these miserable salaries., 97  The
regime of private transactions reduces state control of labor markets to
nothing but a unified global capital, held by the hegemonic power and its
allies, thus exploiting a fractured and state-based labor market over
which there appears to be no movement toward globalization.9" Within
this system the state itself disappears, and a public economic policy is
unthinkable.99 "This is the future that neo-liberal globalization offers."' 00
etcetera. Hasta tierras est~n comprando por el mundo, pensando que como son mis
baratas que en sus proprio paises es una buena inverci6n para el futuro.").
92. Castro makes much of the commodification of baseball players by the United
States. Id. at 13-14.
93. Id. at 11 ("I have seen how they have encourages competition between our
countries, seeing which among them offers more facilities and larger tax breaks for their
investment; they have put Third World countries to competing for investment and free
trade zones." Id.) ("He visto c6mo han puesto a competir a muchos de nuestros paises,
viendo quirnes les dan mds facilidades y mds exenciones de impuestos para invertir; han
puesto a competir a los paises del Tercer Mundo por las inversions y las zonas francas.").
94. See Fidel Casstro Ruz, Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel
Castro Ruz, Primer Secretario del Comit6 Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba y
Presidente de Estado y de Ministros, en el acto central por el XXXI aniversario del asalto
al cuartel Moncada, efectuado en la ciudad de Cienfuegos, July 24, 1984, available at
http://wwwl.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html (last visited Feb, 27, 2006).
95. "It is property law more than any other area of law which constitutes the
institutional foundation of market capitalism and is thus a critical battle ground in the
fight for social justice and wealth redistribution." Uggo Mattei, The Peruvian Civil Code,
Property and Poliunder. Time for a Latin American Alliance to Resist the Neo-Liberal
Order, 5(1) GLOBAL JURIST Topics ART. 3, at 2 (2005), available at
http://www.bepresscom/gj (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) ("At the international level, neo-
liberal policy, with its black and white efficiency based theory of property law, is
interpreted and propagated by the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank and its regional offices
(Inter-American Development Bank), as well as by governments in the G7-G8 club." Id.
at 4).
96. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 11.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 17. The most conservative neo-liberal analysts "don't even want to speak
of the State; the State ought not to be mentioned at all! They wish for a central bank on
the Moon so that no human could be tempted to raise or lower interest rates." Id. ("no
quieren ni oir hablar del Estado, ini siquiera mencionarlo! Los que anhelan un banco
central en la Luna, para que a ningfin humano se le ocurra andar rebajando o subiendo
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These free trade zones are particularly important for two
characteristics, both of which Castro emphasizes. One is the absence of
a public power within them, especially the power to tax. 101 This
amplifies the first core characteristic of the "neo-liberal system," its
fundamental character as a system of private rather than public
relationships. 0 2 The other is the form of production encouraged within
these zones. Domestic production is discouraged, or even eliminated, in
favor of an export driven model grounded in two keys concepts:
(i) product specialization and (ii) over production tied to global credit
facilities. 0 3 Both contribute to the "immense contradiction" of the neo-
liberal system: the problem of unemployment and underemployment for
both individuals and states; the larger the material riches produced for
some, the greater the poverty produced for a larger number of others.0 4
How do the product specialization and over production attributes of
globalist neo-liberalism produce necessary effects on both state
productivity and sovereign debt? First, product specialization produces
or sustains an immense stratification of labor within a globally unified
labor market. Non-technical jobs are exported to the least developed
states and most advanced or skilled work flows up to the most developed
intereses.").
100. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 12 ("Es el porvenir que nos esti ofreciendo
la globalizaci6n neoliberal."). And not just local labor-but also local productive classes
suffer disadvantage of competition against a stacked deck in the form of global capital.
"[D]on't think that it is only workers, but also included are national merchants, small and
medium proprietors of business who have to compete... without reliance on the
abundant commercial credit that their powerful competitors can access for the sale of
their products." Id. ("no vayan a creer que solo a los trabajadores, sino incluso, a los
empresarios nacionales, a los pequefios y medianoas proprietarios que tendr-n que
competir... sin contar con los abundantes cr~ditos comerciales que sus poderosos
competidores pueden utilizr para vender sus productos.").
101. Id. "What would be left of an internal market if an accelerated reduction of
import duties are imposed, which serve as an important source of budgetary income for
many Third World states?" Id. ("Qu6 quedard del mercado interno si se les impone la
reducci6n acelerada de las tarifas aduanales, fuentes ademds importante de los ingresos
presupuestoarios de muchos paises del Tercer Mundo?").
102. Id. at 11. ("We will see how many air lines will remain as state properties, how
many maritime transport lines, how many services survive as property of the people or
the nation." Id.) ("Ya veremos cuAntas lineas a~reas quedan como propriedades
nacionales, cudntas lineas de transporte maritime, cudntos servicios permanecerin como
propriedades del pueblo o de la naci6n.").
103. Id. at 12.
104. Id. ("That while the more they invest and the more they are modernized, the
more people they launch to the street without employment. The productivity of the work;
the most sophisticated teams of the human talent, that multiply the wealth of materials
and at the same time the misery and the dismissals." Id.) ("Que mientras mds invierten y
mis se tecnifican, mdts gente lanzan a la calle sin empleo. La productividad del trabajo;
los equipos mds sofisticados, nacidos del talento humano, que multiplican las riquezas
materials y a la vez la miseria y los despidos.").
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states. 10 5 Required by the laws of global demand and imperfect labor
markets to produce an extraordinary amount of specialized goods for a
global (but not domestic ) market, globalization on these terms
transforms domestic workers into strangers in their own states, unable to
afford to buy even the products they produce.10 6  As a consequence,
production specialization inherent in neo-liberalist globalization
intensifies incentives, within the stateless private sphere of production it
has fostered, for skilled labor to be taken from developing states by
developed ones.' 0 7 However, developing states are also encouraged to
export labor to the developed states in order to perform the most menial
tasks. 108
To meet the needs of developed states for highly skilled workers,
developing states are encouraged to invest capital into education for the
production of skilled workers. This reduces the costs of education by
shifting the costs of education to lower priced foreign education
systems'09-it is more efficient to encourage the immigration of cheaply
105. Id. ("For rich countries, cutting edge industry; for the workers of the Third
World, concocting cowboy pants, tee shirts, costume jewelry, shoes; plant flowers, exotic
fruits and other products for which there is a growing demand in industrial societies."
Id.) ("Para los paises ricos, industrias de punta; para los trabajadores del Tercer Mundo,
confeccionar pantalones de vaquero, pulvores, prendas de vestir, calzado; sembrar flores,
frutas exoticas y otros productos de creciente demanda en las sociedades industrials.").
106. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 13 ("And so that we may become strangers
inside our borders, as I have already suggested, to make things, but they put us, by virtue
of their 'marvelous' economic laws, to produce as many pants as if the world already had
40 million inhabitants, and each one of them had enough money to be buy them." Id.)
("Y para que nos quedamos convertidos en extrajeros dentro de nuestras proprias
fronteras, ya lo dije, confeccionar pitusas y cosas por el estilo, pero nos ponen, en virtud
de sus 'maravillosas' leyes econ6micas, a producir tantos pantalones como si el mundo
contara ya con 40 000 millones de habitants y cada uno de ellos tuviera el dinero
suficiente para comprarse el pantaloncito de vaquero.").
107. Id. ("Where are they? I meet many eminent Latin Americans who are there.
Who took them? Ah!, Venezuela, Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, any Latin American
country; but they have no possibilities in his native country. The industrialized countries
have the monopoly of the laboratories, of the money, they hire them and they snatch them
from the poor nations." Id.) (LDonde estAn? Yo conozco a muchos latinoamericanos
eminentes que estdn allA. ,Quirn los formo? iAh!, Venezuela, Guatemala, Brasil,
Argentina, cualquier pais latinoamericana; pero no tienen posibilidades en su propria
patria. Los paises industrializados tienen el monopolio de los laboratorios, del dinero, los
contratan y se los arrebatan a las naciones pobres.").
108. Id. at 15 ("In the happy developed world hard agricultural work of which the
perfect machine has yet to be invented, street cleaning and other unpleasant work that no
one in consumer societies wants to undertake, how are these tasks done? For these tasks
there are the immigrants from the Third World." Id.) ("En el feliz mundo desarrollado
los trabajos duros de la agricultura... para lo qual no se ha inventado todavia una
mfquina perfecta... limpiar calles y otras tareas ingrates que en las sociedades de
consume nadie quiere realizar, ,c6mo se resuelven?. . . para eso estdn los inmigrantes del
Tercer Mundo.").
109. Id. at 13 ("So that we will have too many universities or they will be used to
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trained skilled labor than to pay for domestic training of their citizens.1 10
"You might have recently read that the United States, in view of the
needs of its cutting edge electronics, computer and other industries,
proposed to acquire in the international market, better said the Third
World, and issue visas to 200,000 qualified workers for these
industries."' 11
The result of this strategy leaves poorer states with high cost
populations and (by limiting income generating power by restricting
recourse to tariffs and similar charges) no prospect of deploying public
resources to ameliorate the problem posed by a population of that
character. Less developed states are locked into a cycle that requires
them to spend what little capital they have to produce support for
production capacity they cannot tax, and producing goods their citizens
cannot afford. In addition, their skilled and well-trained workers, most
of whom emigrate and do not contribute to the broadening of a
production base, leave least trained and least well paid workers to be
supported by the state. The result is that citizens of undeveloped states
find it difficult to participate as consumers in the global market for
goods, and undeveloped states find it difficult to participate on an equal
basis with developed countries in markets for funds.
Overproduction is the other iron rule of neo-liberal globalization.
Global neo-liberalism produces the investment of tremendous sums
without any central planning, resulting in the creation of double the
necessary capacity to produce things and resulting in the employment of
a tremendously large number of laborers throughout the world producing
the same things.1 12 Castro illustrates this idea through the example of
cars. Workers employed throughout the world to produce cars in
"Africa, Latin America and other places don't have a cent to buy these
produce skilled labor for the developed world." Id.) ("De modo que sobrarin nuestras
universidades o quedarfin para producir a bajo costo t6cnico para el mundo
desarrollado.").
110. Id. ("[T]hey don't have enough geniuses, or well qualified workers for their
cutting edge industries, so they come to our world and take away of ours who are then to
us forever." Id.) ("no tienen todas las lumbreras, o los bien calificados trabajadores para
sus industrias de punta, vienen a nuestro mundo y recultan a unos cuantos que despu6s se
pierden para siempre.").
111. Id. ("Habrdn leido en estos dias en la prensa que Estados Unidos, en vista de las
necesidades de sus industrias de computaci6n, electronica, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera, se
propone adquirir en el Mercado international, digase major el Tercer Mundo, y conceder
visas a 200 000 trabajadores muy calificados para sus industrias de punto.").
112. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 18 ("Investing hundreds of thousands of
millions without rhyme or reason; scores of workers producing the same things.... They
have created two times the ability necessary to produce automobiles." Id.) ("Invertir
cientos de miles de millones sin orden ni concierto algun; decenas de millones de
trabajadores produciendos las mismas cosas.... Han creado el doble de capacidad
necesaria para producir autom6viles.").
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goods, nor roads on which to use them, nor garages, all of which would
in any case further ruin Third World countries, wasting needed for social
development and further destroying the environment."'1 13 According to
Castro, if follows that overproduction intensifies the obliteration of the
state from any possibility of control over the welfare of its citizens.
Let us suppose that other Third World countries produce refrigerators
of acceptable quality and low cost [for domestic consumption.] Its
powerful competitors constantly revise the design, invest fabulous
sums in increasing the prestige of their trademarks, manufacture in
many free trade zones with low wages or in any other place exempted
from taxation, abundant capital or financial mechanisms to obtain
credits that are amortized in one, two, three or whatever many years,
markets saturated with domestic electrical products that are the fruit
of the anarchy and the chaos of the distribution of global investment
capital, under a generalized instruction to grow and develop on an
export oriented basis as the IMF counsels, what space is left for
national industry, for whom and how will they export, where are the
potential consumers among the thousands of poor, hungry and
unemployed who inhabit the greater part of this planet? 114
The state is thus written out of production, and by writing the state out of
production, the market writes the individual out as well. This
overproduction misallocates resources without any corrective action that
is possible through public law.
Consumerism provides the key to understanding the power of
overproduction both in the developed as well as in the developing world.
It is an essential tool of neo-liberal globalization, and a powerful
disciplinary tool against state attempts to move their political community
in a different direction. 15 This tool supplies the carrot that seduces even
those who have absolutely no prospects of sharing in the fruits of
globalized overproduction as well as the states that borrow to finance
113. Id. ("Qu6 clients para los autom6viles? Estadn en Africa, en America Latina y
en otros muchos lugares del mundo, solo que no tienen un centavo para adquirirlos, ni
gasoline, ni autopistas, ni talleres, que acabarian aiin mdis los paises del Tercer Mundo,
despilfarrando recursos que requiere el desarrollo social y destruyendo ain mds la
naturaleza.").
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id. at 16 ("This is how it is, inculcating the people with all of that
[consumerism]; they have dehumanized millions, dozens, hundred of millions of
persons, increasing their suffering all the more when they are least capable of satisfying
their most basic needs because they have access neither to doctors or schools." Id.) ("Es
asi, han inculcado todo eso a la gente; han enajenado a millones, a decenas de milliones y
a cierntos de milliones de personas, y las hacen sufrir tanto mds cuanto menos son
capaces de satisfacer sus necesidades elementales porque no tienen siquiera el medico ni
tienen la escuela.").
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these unattainable dreams." 6  It provides a justification for
overproduction that is ultimately unsustainable on economic and
ecological grounds.' 7  Castro suggests the example of the fantasy of
automobile ownership for every individual is a well known expression of
the export driven globalized neo-liberal consumer vision, and if this
fantasy was actually realized in the People's Republic of China, "100
million hectares of land that is needed for the production of food would
be converted into highways, garages, car parks with nothing left for the
cultivation of even one grain of rice."'" 8 Thus, Castro concludes, the
"consumption model being imposed on the world is not only crazy but
chaotic and absurd as well," and "not that [Castro pretends] that the
planet should be converted into a monastery of Cartesian monks, but [he]
does believe that the planet has no alternative but to define the models of
attainable and affordable consumption, in the principles of which
humanity ought to be educated."'" 9 However, the current system of
consumption is meant solely to enhance the privileged position of
consumers in industrialized states through the operation of a system in
which the underdeveloped world provides the greatest subsidy.
20
116. Id. at 14 ("Thus the people are poisoned with this propaganda, so that even the
powerful are cruelly influenced and induced to dream of the possibility of all things,
impossible for them in fact, that capitalism can offer them." Id.) (Asi van envenenando a
la gente con esa propaganda, de modo que hasta los poderosos son influenciados de
forma cruel y puestos a sofiar con el cielo, imposible para ellos, que el capitalismo
ofrece.").
117. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 14-15.
118. Id. at 15 ("Me imagino que si en China hicieron eso, los 100 milliones de
hectares de que se disponen para producir alimentos, se conviertemn en autopistas,
garajes, parqueos de autom6viles y no que daria d6nde cultivar un grano de arroz").
119. Id. (Es loco, incluso ca6tico y absurdo, el modelo de coinsumo que le estadn
imponiendo al mundo... . No prentendo que este planeta sea un convento de monjes
cartujos, pero si pienso que este planeta no tiene otra alternative que definir ctdales deben
ser los patrones o modelos de consumo alcanzables y asequibles, en los cuales debe ser
educada la himanidad").
120. Thus, Castro asks,
why should people today endure on a daily basis-exclusively on account of
the commercial rationales, profits and interests of the superprivileged and
powerful elites, under the imperium of chaotic economic laws and institutions,
that have not been nor are nor ever will be eternal, like the famous market laws
transformed into objects of idolatry, discussed at all times as if they were Holy
Writ-hunger, unemployment premature death, curable disease, ignorance,
lack of culture and all types of human and social calamities, if they could create
all the riches necessary to satisfy reasonable human needs in a manner
compatible with the preservation of nature and life on our planet?
Id. at 15 ("Por qu& debido exclusivamente a rezones comerciales, ganancias e intereses
de elites superprivilegiadas y poderosas, bajo el imperio de leyes econ6micas ca6ticas e
instituciones que no son eteras, ni lo fueron y lo serdn nunca, como las famosas leyes
del Mercado convertido en objeto de idolatria, en palabra sacrosanta que a todas horas se
menciona, todos los dias, el hombre de hoy tiene que soportar hambre, desempleo,
muerte premature, enfermedades curables, ignorancia, incultura y todo tipo de
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Thus the great importance of overproduction within neo-liberal
globalization: it is the means of reinforcing the power and wealth of the
industrialized elite by diverting production to those products and services
that only the elite can afford or need, thus producing a great global
hunger for the same products among the poor of the developing world
and the states in which they live,' 21 a hunger that economic theory
suggests might be satisfied but in reality leaves barely enough resources
to satisfy the basic needs of that population.122 Overproduction produces
a massive misallocation of resources from the perspective of maximizing
the economic condition of the global population. The misallocation is
deliberate and meant to sustain the power and privilege of the individuals
and states of the developed world, that is of the former colonial and
imperial powers (Europe) and their most successful offspring (the United
States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand).
The fate of the former Soviet Union illustrates well the problems of
the standard global vision on non-developed states.123 Castro takes the
standard version of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise
(eventually) of a modem free (or freer) market Russian state, 124 and
inverts it. 125 No longer the story of a command economy completely
ossified and worn out, unable to maintain a level of productivity in the
absence of market discipline, or a system that necessarily collapsed as a
result of nearly a century of misallocation of resources, the USSR for
Castro epitomizes the way the IMF, through its monetary policies, could
wreck even the strongest of states. 26 The object is to keep states other
calamidades humanas y socials, si pudieran crearse crearse todas las riquezas necesarioas
para satisfacer necesidades himanas razonables que sean compatibles con la preservaci6n
de la naturalieza y la vida en nuestro planeta?").
121. Id. at 16 ("sowing impossible dreams in the rest of the planet") ("sembrando
suefios imposibles en el resto del planeta.").
122. Id.
123. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 18.
124. For an account of the collapse of the Soviet Union, see WISLA SURASKA, How
THE SOVIET UNION DISAPPEARED: AN ESSAY ON THE CAUSES OF DISSOLUTION (1998);
WALTER LAQUEUR, THE DREAM THAT FAILED: REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVIET UNION
(1994).
125. In giving a description, it is not suggested that this inversion is too great a
simplification to withstand dispassionate analysis. It is clear that the fall of the Soviet
Union and the rise, fall and reconstitution of Russia after 1991 had a great impact, both
materially and ideologically on Castro. Castro's analysis of the transformation of the
Soviet Union into Russia may better explain the psychology of the Cuban Revolution
after 1991 than it explains any sort of Russian reality. See, e.g., J. Richard Planas, Why
Does Castro Survive? 154(3) WORLD AFFAIRS 87 (1992).
126. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 17-18 ("There, in the Old USSR, they
arrived with their neoliberal prescriptions and market, and they have caused incredible
destructions, truly incredible! They have split nations, dismantled federations of
republics, economically and politically; they have reduced the life expectancy, as much
as 14 and 15 years; they have multiplied the infant mortality three or four times; have
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than developed states at the edge of a financial precipice so that IMF is in
a position to control its economic policy in favor of the neo-liberal
model.127  But rather than provide Russia with some of the large
contribution the United States made to the IMF 128 "to avoid political or
economic catastrophe ... what they sought to do was demand a bunch of
conditions that are impossible to implement. They demand the reduction
of the national budget which has already been reduced below an essential
level, they demand free conversion, the immediate payment of high debt,
all of the requirements that deplete whatever reserves may be left in any
state."' 129 Even European states as powerful as the United Kingdom have
had to adjust to the realities of neo-liberal globalization in the service of
the United States. 1
30
Connected to this analysis is Castro's assertion of a close
connection between currency standards and the primacy of the U.S.
dollar in international commerce, and U.S hegemony with its
created social and economic problems that not even a resurrected Dante would be capable
of imagining." Id.) ("Alld, en la Antigua URSS, llegaron con sus recetas neoliberales y
de mercado y han ocasionado destrozos increibles, iverdaderamente increibles!,
desgajado naciones, desarticulados federaciones de repblicas, econ6mica y
politicamente; han reducido las perspectives de vida, en algunas de ellas 14 y 15 ahios;
han multiplicado la mortalidad infantile tres o cuatro veces; han creado problemas socials
y econ6micos que ni siquiera un Dante resucitado seria capaz de imaginar."). For a
similar account, see, e.g., DAVID LOCKWOOD, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET UNION: A
STUDY IN GLOBALIZATION (2000).
127. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 20 ("They pretend to maintain Russia at the
edge of a precipice. It is not a small country, it the largest country in the world with a
population of 146 million people... where a social explosion, internal conflict of one
kind or another could cause terrible harm." Id.) ("A Rusia la pretenden mantener al
borde de un abismo. No es un pais pequefio, es un pais que tiene la mayor extenci6n
territorial del mundo y 146 millones de habitants... donde una explosion social, un
conflicto interno o cualquier cosa puede causar terribles dafilo.").
128. Castro claims this amounted to about $90 million. Id. at 19-20.
129. Id. at 20 ("Lo que se les ocurre es exigirle un mont6n de condiciones imposibles
de aplicar. Le exigen que baje presupuestos que estdn ya por debajo del limite
indispensable, le exigen la libre conversion, el; pago inmediato de elevadas deudas, todos
aquellos requisitos que acaban con las reservas que puedan quedarle a cualquier pais. No
piensan, no escarmienten; pretenden mantenerla en situaci6n precaria, al borde de un
abismo, con ayuda humanitaria, exigiendo condiciones y creando peligros realmente
serios."). Castro further explained in this context: "They do not think, they don't learn;
they pretend to maintain the country in a precarious situation, at the edge of an abyss,
with humanitarian aid, imposing conditions and creating really serious dangers." Id.
("No piensan, no escarmientan; pretenden mantenerla en situaci6n precaria, al borde de
un abismo, con ayuda humanitaria, exigiendo condiciones y creando peligros realmentes
serios.").
130. Castro argues that one of the principle reasons for the creation of the Euro was to
protect the Member States of the European Union from the power of the U.S. dollar to
avoid the crises of currency speculation. Id. at 18-19. Castro asserts that part of the
power of the United States derives from its ability to destabilize other economies through
currency fluctuations against the dollar. Id. at 23.
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implementation through the IMF.13 1  Castro asserted that since the
development of the Bretton Woods system, the United States Dollar has
served as the global reserve currency. "This has given the United States
enormous power and special privileges, which it has been using ever
since to advance its own interests; it has given the United States the
power to manage the global economy, establish the rules, dominate the
IMF in which an 85% vote is required for action to be taken and with
17.5% of the votes the United States can effectively veto any action, and
on that basis the United States dominates and practically owns the IMF,
they have the last word and have achieved the imposition of the global
economic order which we now must suffer."
132
Thus, the heart of the political basis of global economic theory, and
its consequences for state debt: Castro argues that neo-liberal
conceptions of market efficiency as a neutral rule of the a-political social
science of economics actually masks its political dimensions. Neo-
liberal efficiency is defined and deployed to confirm rather than to test
the benefits of overproduction and labor specialization within a system
postulated as one where the state cannot interfere. Overproduction and
labor specialization, renamed competition and open markets for labor,
become essential to efficiency. State regulation and taxation become
distortions of perfect efficiency in perfect markets. 33 The values of both
are judged in relation to reductions in price. But price reductions in such
a system, Castro argues, are really price reallocations. Price reductions
within the neo-liberal globalized market system are essentially a subsidy
in favor of the consumers of products residing in developed countries
that are borne by the workers, political and economic communities of
less developed states. Individuals bear the subsidy through lower wages
than they might otherwise obtain. The state effectively subsidizes price
reductions by tax forbearance, passing that tax burden to others,
principally local commercial interests and workers. These local
commercial interests and workers now bear a double subsidy through
depressed wages and increased taxes. Other services provided through
taxes are either forgone or paid through loans from developed states.
The IMF serves a critical role in this process of transfers to
developing countries in order to subsidize overproduction and maintain
131. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 22-24.
132. Id. at 13 ("Eso le dio un enorme poder y un especial privilegio a Estados Unidos,
que lo ha estado usando hasta ahora en favor de sus proprios intereses; le dio el poder de
manejar la economia mundial, establecer las reglas, dominar el Fondo Monetario, donde
hace falta un 85% de los votos para tomar algun acuerdo, y con el 17.5% ellos pueden
bloquear cualquier decision de esa instituci6n, y, por tanto, dominan, son prdcticamente
duefios del Fondo Monetario, dicen la tiltima palabra, y han logrado imponer el orden
econ6mico mundial que estamos padeciendo.").
133. Id. at 19.
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the system.134  The last alternative is exceedingly perverse-the
developed states enjoy the benefit of product price subsidies and then
increase their wealth by financing the subsidy they enjoy through loans
to developing states. When repayments cannot be made by the
developing states, the developed states might take payment in kind, in
the form of natural or other resources, the only thing the state can sell.
Thus the last source of subsidy: future generations will have to forego
the misallocation of non-renewable resources by the current generation.
In the meantime, developed states draw additional wealth from
developing states through transfers of capital in the form of interest
payments. In a sense, the developing world is obliged to pay part of the
costs of their own exploitation.
It is the effectively mandatory subsidy by states that serves as
Castro's shorthand for the current system overseen by the IMF, and the
importance of sovereign indebtedness to the operation of the system,
which can be summarized roughly along the following lines: States must
participate in the construction of a global marketplace on principles of
neo-liberal economic (but also to some extent also its social and
political) theory. That system is grounded on private property, with the
primacy of neutral and a-political markets, and the absence of state
interference with market processes either in the form of regulation or
taxation of the production and market processes. 35 This market system
masks a bias toward the reinforcement of the economic dominance of
developed states-the primary consumers of goods-by fostering the
production of too many goods at prices substantially below the real costs
of production.
The resulting imbalance must be made up somehow. At some point
real costs will have to be paid. That burden tends to fall on political
communities. Not all political communities share the burden of
subsidizing overproduction, however. As a trans-border and porous
system, the organization of economic activity as private and market
based makes it as easy for developed states to subsidize while reaping the
134. Castro relates the story of the 1998 funding of the IMF for the purpose of
averting financial crises in Russia and Brazil. The developed states preferred to act
through the IMF and its lending conditions than to deliver aid directly to the states
affected. Id. at 19-20.
135. Consumption and income taxes-that is taxation falling on individuals and at the
very beginning or end of the process leading from extraction to consumption is
permitted. This affects even the United States and is consonant with the normative
foundations of economic globalization on the basis of the Washington Consensus. See,
e.g., LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, ECONOMIC PARABLES & POLICIES: SAVING FOR AMERICA'S
FUTURE 50-69 (1998). The Europeans have been taxing income and consumption for
years as well. For a discussion, see, e.g., THE TAx SYSTEM IN INDUSTRIALIZED
COUNTRIES (Ken Messere, ed., 1998).
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benefits of overproduction, making it difficult for developing states to do
the same.
Four factors inherent in the market-based system contribute to this
result:
First, labor specialization shifts the most skilled and highest paying
jobs to the developed states and away from developing states.
Developing states must make due with the lowest paid and least skilled
work, with the labor price depressed further by an excess of population,
and a scarcity of even the lowest paying jobs and competition among
developing states even for these jobs.
Second, overproduction shifts the benefits of misallocation of
resources from the developing to the developed states. Overproduction
depresses the price of these goods, making them more affordable in the
developed world, where the highest paying jobs tend to be found, but
remain unaffordable in the states where they are for the most part
produced by workers whose wages are too low to pay for them.
Third, the incentives to move capital freely tends to make it more
difficult for developing states to tax consumption or income of the
entities producing goods for the global market because wealth, like
goods, tends to flow toward developed states and away from developing
states. Moreover, because of competition for even low wage work
enterprises, developing states are forced to subsidize their capital by
foregoing any power to tax local economic operations of global capital.
Because individual consumption and income tends to be lower among
the poor, the developing state tends to have a much lower wealth base to
tax, but a much more needy population to govern.
Fourth, the propaganda of consumerism keeps the wheels of
overproduction going and fuels a constant aspirational hope among those
in developing states. The constant lack of satisfaction adds a level of
need to the population-they want what individuals in the developed
states appear to have, but they can neither afford it, nor their own basic
needs. Critical citizen needs of these sorts that remain unmet, in whole
or in part, might cause social and political upheaval-and money can
ameliorate both.
States, without wealth to tax and with critical needs to meet, must
borrow. Developing states borrow directly, in the debt markets, and
indirectly, through the IMF, from developing states. In effect,
developing states acquire as a debt obligation a portion of the wealth that
represents the required subsidy of global production at the heart of the
neo-liberal system. Thus the spiral deepens.
Sovereign debt tends to be acquired under conditions designed to
perpetuate the system-the conditions imposed on the debt contribute to
an increasing inability of states to generate the wealth they need to repay,
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or loans are made to states whose leaders are satisfied to act as agents of
the developing states and contribute to the subordination of their nations
within the global economic system. Eventually, the loan framework
within this system cannot be repaid. States must borrow additional sums
of money to pay the portion of prior loans which are unpaid while
meeting continuing need, or sell their wealth (in the form of natural
resources or other wealth) in an effort to pay their loans.
Now the cycle is both complete and recurring: a cycle that
effectively produces states whose resources and productive capacity are
owned and used for the benefit of others while subsidizing the
production of wealth for others. 36 The cycle is fed by the cultivation of
an unattainable consumerism in individuals worldwide as an inseparable
part of a system based on markets for goods. That consumerism forms
the outward manifestation of an economic dynamic in which the interests
and needs of developed states are subsidized by developing states that
are forced into a system of endless borrowing. That need to borrow
represents both a form of the subsidy of developed states built into the
neo-liberal model of global economics, and a means of destabilizing and
weakening developing states so that, always near crisis, these states
remain dependent on and subordinate to the creditor states and their
instrumentalities. 1
37
136. With the aid of mathematics, we have analyzed all of the variations
suggested to resolve the problem of state debt: with actual interest rates or
reduced interest rates, with new credits or without new credits, with limited
payments associated to export levels or without such limits, with moratoria or
without moratoria, and even on the assumption of a sustained accelerated rate
of development that is itself utopian, the result of all of these analyses is that
sovereign debt, like an enormous and monstrous cancer, whose malignant cells
reproduce at an accelerating rate, tends to reproduce itself and grow without
limit.
Fidel Castro Ruz, Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz,
Primer Secretario del Comite Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba y Presidente de los
Consejos de Estado y de Ministros, en la VIII Conferencia Cumbre del Movimiento de
Paises No Alineados, celebrada en Harare, Zimbabwe, Sept. 2, 1986, available at
http://wwwl.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html ("Con la ayuda de las matemdticas,
hemos analizado todas las variants que se sugieren para resolver el problema de la deuda:
con los intereses actuales o con intereses mis bajos, con nuevos crrditos o sin nuevos
crrditos, con limites de pagos asociados a las exportaciones o sin un limite, con moratoria
o sin moratoria, y aun en el supuesto de un desarrollo sostenido a ritmos elevados, lo cual
inda con la utopia, el resultado de todos los andlisis es que la deuda, como un enorme y
monstruoso cancer, cuyas clulas malignas se multiplican a ritmo acelerado, tiende a
reproducirse y crecer hasta lo infinito.").
137. The nature of dependency is varied. Castro explains:
There is a bit of everything: depression in some countries, inflation in others,
formulas and measures for destabilizing governments. Everyone on earth now
understands that the IMF, for all the states it seeks to help, for all the states that
it pretends to help, actually drowns those states economically and destabilizes
them politically. There is no better way to put it than that the aid of the IMF is
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There is a parallelism between the need for capital on the micro
level (for the creation of sites for production within the global economic
network to participate in world markets), and the need for capital on a
macro level (for the absorption of the true costs of production by the
providers of labor and materials). This parallelism produces a tendency
to see the "problem" of state borrowing in private contract and
bankruptcy terms on the part of the IMF. The appropriate analogy for
the IMF is always the company or individual who cannot learn to live
within his means and for whom the cultivation of appropriate and
"responsible" behavior is most important. 38 Castro looks at the same
thing and understands the "problem" of state borrowing in public terms,
putting a political dimension on the consequences of a perpetual
condition of state indebtedness, or obligation, to others: an
intensification of hierarchy and subordination with political, social,
cultural as well as economic dimensions.
III. Implications: A Preliminary View of Solutions and the Articulation
of Parallel Visions by the United Nations and in Roman Catholic
Thought
There are a number of implications that flow from embrace of either
vision. This section is meant to suggest some of the more interesting
consequences that might follow from adoption of either system as the
the devil's kiss.
FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 24 ("Hay hoy de todo: depression uen unos paises,
inflaci6n en otros, recetas y medidas que desestablizan a los gobiemos. Todos en el
mundo comprenden ya que el Fondo Monetario International a todo pais que ayuda, a
todo pais que pretende ayudar, to hunde econ6micamente y lo desestabiliza
politicamente. Nunca pudo decirse major que las ayudas del Fondo Monetario
International son el beso del Diablo.").
138. Indeed, there is a strong parallel between the rhetoric accompanying the passage
of recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005, described generally as pro creditor, and the rhetoric of state responsibility for its
obligations in light of the recklessness of its past patterns of borrowing to live beyond its
means. See, e.g., The Columnist Manifesto, The Visa/MBNA-America Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 2005, Why not allow-nay, require-legislation to bear the names of its
corporate sponsors? Mar. 9, 2005, available at http://thecolumnistmanifesto.
blogspot.com/2005/03/visa-mbna-america-bankruptcy-reform_09.html ("The rhetoric of
the bankruptcy 'reform' bill's Republican backers is full of talk of 'personal
responsibility."'). See also Public Broadcast Service, Now: Debating the Bankruptcy
Reform Bill, Mar. 25, 2005, available at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/
bankruptcydebate.html ("Some critics... maintain that the new means test is "one size
fits all" and doesn't take into account the myriad of reasons that lead people to seek
bankruptcy. Other critics point to perceived "loopholes" which seem to allow wealthier
bankruptcy filers to protect more of their assets.... Proponents of the bill say that the
great rise in bankruptcies necessitates tightening the rules. They point to people who
seem to be 'gaming' the systen-filing for Chapter 7 when they don't deserve the 'fresh
start' it promises.").
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basis of sovereign lending. The purpose here is to avoid covering well-
worn ground, and in particular, the actual consequences and contours of
the current debate about the boundaries of lending and sovereign debt
under the Washington Consensus. That subject has already been given
wide attention within authoritative global institutions and academia.
1 39
Here the focus is more generally on the implications of each vision for
building the boundaries within which the international regulation of
states can be authoritatively discussed (especially by those with power to
do so). The consequences of that boundary building are great for
defining the character of the state as an actor and its role in the context of
the emerging global system of economic and political regulation.
Both visions share certain similarities. Both visions are
energetically unitary. Castro is unapologetically political and public in
orientation. For him it is impossible to separate the private concerns
from issues requiring direction and control by the political community.
Every activity has a bearing on the welfare of the people, and to that
extent, must be understood as both essentially public and political in
nature. In this context, a movement to private decision-making appears
to put the economic over the political, and appears to be an attempt by
the state to reduce the power of the people to govern themselves. The
IMF system is unapologetically private and transactional in
orientation. 40 States serve only to facilitate the private sphere.
Industrial countries need to reform their pension systems to make
them viable over the long term. Emerging market economies need to
press ahead with fiscal and financial sector reforms that will deliver
debt sustainability. And low income countries need to focus on
issues like the rule of law, institutional and other reforms that will
permit more rapid and sustainable growth.1
4
'
139. See discussion at Part II, supra.
140. Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, nicely states the
IMF view of economic reform and growth promotion: "Economic growth permits rising
living standards and poverty reduction. Arguing over how to cut the cake can never get
us very far if we are serious about reducing poverty. Make the cake bigger is the only
way of helping the poor over the longer term." Anne 0. Krueger, Bismarck's Warning:
The Challenge of Economic Policy Reform in the Twenty-First Century, Lecture given at
University Philosophical Society, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, Apr. 5, 2005,
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2005/040505a.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2006).
141. Id. Developing countries especially require continued adjustment to facilitate
integration into a global private sphere.
And there is an urgent need for further reform in low income countries if they
are to achieve the more rapid growth they so badly need. For many, especially
in sub-Saharan Africa, the improvement recorded over a relatively short time is
welcome. But growth is not yet rapid enough to make attainment of the
Millennium Development Goals likely. Reforms aimed at improving the rule
[Vol. 24:3
2006] IDEOLOGIES OF GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGN DEBT 535
While IMF studies concede the value of public spending on human
capital, it suggests that spending on markets can have comparable
effects. 1
42
Both Castro and the IMF embrace an aggressively globalist outlook.
The IMF is an institutional component essential to the implementation of
a stable market oriented economic system based on open, level,
transparent, non-coercive, private transactions of goods and services with
no interference. 43 The market and contract stands at the apex of the
hierarchy of global norms. Castro posits a nation-state-based
institutionalist globalization based on the primacy of rights to
development, focused on the nation-state as the foundation of a world
political order. The nation-state and political stability stand at the apex
of the hierarchy of global norms. As Pierre Bourdieu noted several years
ago, both use the same vocabulary, though to very different ends.
144
of law, strengthening public institutions, combating corruption, make public
expenditure more efficient and more effective-all these are part of the
necessary groundwork to make more rapid growth possible.
Id.
142. Emanuele Baldacci, et. al., Social Spending, Human Capital, and Growth in
Developing Countries: Implications for Achieving the MDGs, IMF Working Paper, Fiscal
Affairs Department, WP/04/217, Nov. 2004, available at http://www.imf.org.
143. As Krueger observes:
A sound macroeconomic framework also requires institutions that can
administer laws fairly, that can enforce property rights, that don't put
unreasonable burdens on businesses that export, that encourage competition
and enterprise. It means reducing trade restrictions, lowering or removing tariff
and non-tariff barriers, encouraging foreign investment. It means developing a
sound financial system, with well-capitalized and well-run banks that can
allocate credit where it can be most efficiently used, rather than propping up
badly run but politically well-connected companies. There has to be a level
playing field, with a clear and balanced incentive structure, and microeconomic
reforms that foster enterprise.
Krueger, supra note 140.
144. See Pierre Bourdieu and Lo'ic Wacquan, Neoliberal Newspeak: Notes On The
New Planetary Vulgate (World Social Forum, Library of Alternatives, June 30, 2003),
available at http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/dinamic.php?pagina=bourdieu-ing
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (expanded translation by David Macey and Loic Wacquant of
an article that originally appeared in French in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, 554, May
2000, pp. 6-7). Bourdieu explained that:
Its vocabulary, which seems to have sprung out of nowhere, is now on
everyone's lips: "globalization" and "flexibility," "governance" and
"employability," "underclass" and "exclusion," "new economy" and "zero
tolerance," "communitarianism" and "multiculturalism," not to mention their
so-called postmodern cousins, "minority," "ethnicity," "identity,"
"fragmentation," etc. The diffusion of this new planetary vulgate-from which
the terms "capitalism," "class," "exploitation," "domination," and "inequality"
are conspicuous by their absence, having been peremptorily dismissed under
the pretext that they are obsolete and non-pertinent-is the result of a new type
of imperialism whose effects are all the more powerful and pernicious in that it
is promoted not only by the partisans of the neoliberal revolution who, under
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Inherent in both are the corollary norms of democracy and fairness.
The system fostered through the IMF is grounded in the notion that
democracy is only possible through the development of individual wealth
in stable, open, market oriented systems. 45  The pursuit of gain, free
from state tyranny, is the greatest antipode of an anti-democratic political
control, and thus the best defense against the anti-democratic forces of
political, social, economic and cultural oppression. 146  For Castro, the
reverse is irrefutably true. Democracy is impossible in systems under
which economic control is separated from economic production.1
47
Also inherent in both are the corollary norms of the public nature of
cover of "modernization," intend to remake the world by sweeping away the
social and economic conquests of a century of social struggles, henceforth
depicted as so many archaisms and obstacles to the emergent new order, but
also by cultural producers (researchers, writers and artists) and left-wing
activists who, for the vast majority of them, still think of themselves as
progressives.
Id.
145. The American government recently described this relationship in its statement in
opposition to a recommendation from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
for the appointment of a special representative special representative on the issue of
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises:
Throughout the world, businesses are creating an environment to help ensure
the strongest possible promotion of human rights. By the very nature of their
core activities, they provide employment and income for individuals. They
provide essential goods and services. They contribute to education, training
and healthcare. They provide the venues for the organization of civil society
and labor movements that promote democratization. They contribute to the
empowerment of individuals that is at the heart of ensuring protection of human
rights.
United States of America, Explanation of the Position of the United States of America on
UN-Resolution of 20 April 2005, available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/
Links/Repository/120185 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
146. These ideas were recently well expressed by the U.S. President, George W. Bush
in his Second Inaugural Address. See George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, Jan.
20, 2005, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html
("Through much of the last century, America's faith in freedom and democracy was a
rock in a raging sea. Now it is a seed upon the wind, taking root in many nations. Our
democratic faith is more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of our
humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along.") Id.
147. Fidel Castro Ruz, Las manos del gobierno de EEUU estdn sucias, in FIDEL
CASTRO Ruz, DE SEATTLE AL 11 DE SEPTIEMBRE 185 (2002) ("No one should try to fool
and confuse us with the new terminology flowing from out of the hypocritical
propaganda of those specialists in lies and deceit, in the service of which there has been
imposed on humanity an economic and political order increasingly inequal and unjust,
that has absolutely nothing to do with solidarity and democracy, nor even a hint of
respect for even the most limited rights that every human being deserves." Id.) ("Nadie
trate de engafiarnos y confundirnos con las nuevas terminologias salidas de la propaganda
hip6crita de los especialistas en engafios y mentiras, al servicio de los que han impuesto a
la humanidad un orden econ6mico y politico cada vez mds desigual e injusto, que no
tiene absolutamente nada de solidario o democrdticoni siquiera un dpice de respeto por
los mds minimos derechos que son acreedores los seres humanos.").
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state control and anti-subordination among the community of states. For
Castro, of principle importance in the context of state debt is the
"intransigent defense of the principle of self-determination of our
political communities that requires the end of interference by
international organisms in the financial administration of our nations.,
148
Sovereign debt, for Castro represents the passing of power from the
states as independent political entities at the apex of power, to other, now
more powerful global entities.
1 49
In the context of these competing visions of global governance,
sovereign debt can only be understood under either perspective as a
subset of a much more universal approach to world order. Both would
impose obligations and duties on creditor and lender, these duties serving
as proxies for the control relationships underlying the act of lending or
borrowing. But each would accomplish this from fundamentally
opposite directions. Both Castro and the IMF see the same thing, but
understand what they see in such different terms that it is sometimes hard
to remember that it is not the object seen but the meaning they ascribe to
that object which separates the two views.150
148. Fidel Castro Ruz, Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro
Ruz, Primer Secretario del Comite Central de Partido Comuinista de Cuba y Presidente
de los Consejos de Estado y Ministros, en la session de clausura del encuentro sobra la
deuda extema de America Latina y el Caribe, efectuada en el Palacio de las
Convenciones clausura del didlogo juvenil y estudiantil de am6rica Latina y el Caribe
sobre la deuda externa, celebrado en el Palacio de las Convenciones, Sept. 14, 1985,
available at http://wwwl.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1985/19850915.html
[hereinafter FCR 1985 Speech] ("la defensa intransigente del principio de
autodeterminaci6n de nuestros pueblos requiere el fin de la interferencia de organismos
intemacionales en la administraci6n financiera de nuestras naciones").
149. "Latin American debt is so great that many of the nations of the region, whatever
their Gross National Product might show, cannot guarantee a majority of their citizens a
decent quality of life. Their economies, which in macro economic terms appear to be
proceeding well, have actually decreased in the hands of the great financial and
technological powers." Fidel Castro Ruz, Cuba no negocia ni vende su Revoluci6n, in
FIDEL CASTRO Ruz, DE SEATTLE AL 11 DE SEPTIEMBRE 69, 74 (2002) ("La deuda
latinoamericana es tan grande que muchas de las naciones de la region, qualquiera que
sea su Producto Intemo Bruto, no les guatrantizan una calidad de vida digna a la mayoria
de sus cuidadanos. Sus economias, que en cifras macroecon6micas parecen a veces
marchar bien, han caido en las manos de las grandes potentcias financieras y
tecnol6gicas .... ).
150. An excellent example was recently provided in the context of the dispersion of
sovereign debt. The Managing director of the IMF saw the dispersion of sovereign debt
as key factor for the systematization and regularization of the debtor-creditor relationship.
The problem was one of managing markets for debt involving a small set of large debtors
and a very large and dispersed set of lenders holding debt, which itself has become a
highly liquid form of wealth. See, e.g., K6hler, supra note 63. For Castro, the same
dispersion of holding in sovereign debt suggests key evidence of the gross inequality of
terms to which debtors have been subject. Such dispersion is evidence of the value to
lenders of exploitative terms meant to benefit a growing class of lenders from the
developing world by providing a means of wealth transfer to them from the developing
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The IMF system is grounded in Western notions of contract and
private property. The state, like a corporation, is increasingly viewed as
the nexus of complex amalgamations of contracts among stakeholders in
a political community, whose individual and collective contract
arrangements overlap the state and other private and private
amalgamations of economic, social, and political power. In a world in
which entities are proxies for systems of self-referencing contracts, the
debt of sovereigns, like the debt of other amalgamations, is just another
form of contract, and should be subject to the same sets of uniform rules
for enforcement. The object is not necessarily the preservation of a
particular quantum of state power or dignity; the public character of the
community is irrelevant. The critical consideration is the contract itself;
the contract must be honored absent overreaching or fraud by lenders.
The object of all action is not to preserve a particular character of the
state but to strengthen the systems viewed as the basis for maximizing
the wealth, in the aggregate, of individuals, either at a macro level, when
measured collectively and on a global basis, or on a micro level, when
measured within states or sub-state communities. States, like
corporations, NGOs and other entities, serve best when they help
produce or maintain the greatest efficiency of markets for transactions of
all kinds---economic, political, social and cultural. Sovereign debt, to the
extent it represents inefficiencies or "wrong" social, political or
economic choices, must be minimized. The IMF vision shifts ultimate
responsibility for debt to the shareholders of every nation state: its
citizens and their productive capacity. States are stripped of an active
public function, other than to facilitate market transactions, protect
against fraud, and maintain productive infrastructure for the benefit of
market participants. This is a good thing because states are usually
inefficient at the delivery of services and political control tends to inhibit
human freedom.
Castro takes the foundational ideas of the market system-utility
maximization, markets and democracy, and inverts them; contorting
them into criticisms of the very systems created to further these
principles. Democracy is impossible in an economic system in which the
democratic order is subject to control by creditors and debtor states are
world. Fidel Castro Ruz, Hay que rescatarel espiritu de lucha, in FIDEL CASTRO Ruz, DE
SEATrLE AL 1I DE SEPTIEMBRE (2002) 149, 153. The inequities of the terms of this debt,
suggested by its very dispersion, also suggest the equity of debt cancellation. Id. at 153-
54. This is a debt that "continues to feed on itself in a vicious cycle where one seeks
additional debt to pay interest" that continues to increase as the size of the debt itself
increases. Id. at 154 ("La deuda continua alimentintose a si misma en un circulo vicioso
donde se pide prestado para poder pagar los intereses.").
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made to subsidize developed state wealth. 151 Sovereign debt analogized
to corporate debt has a peculiar effect on the public or political function
of states as representatives of political communities. Debt conditions can
act as addendums to political constitutions. In effect, covenants and
conditions of state debt can modify the constitutional structure of nation-
states in effect if not in form. Economic policy power is effectively
diverted from the political community-the sovereign as the people of
the nation, to the creditors-lenders asserting a power to direct a core
function of sovereignty.152  Where the debtor is a corporation and the
ultimate sovereign the shareholders, subject to regulation by a political
community, this result is not problematic. However, where the debtor is
a state, and the ultimate sovereigns the citizens of that state, the result
appears to reduce the sovereign power of nations. 53 A consequence: a
conflation of governance models for states and corporations fundamental
to the West is rejected by Castro as fundamentally incompatible with his
theory of the state as a public political body. Furthermore,
It is inconceivable that democratic governments will call out their
armed forces to suppress its people so that it might pay its external
debt, and to kill its people like they killed them in Santo Domingo,
because the measures required by the IMF have already cost more
than 100 lives in Santo Domingo, more than 400 injured from
151. We look at the situation in Latin America, where the more people talk about
democracy, the more there are shantytowns, dozens of millions of illiterate
people, millions of unemployed persons, and tens and tens of millions of people
who go without medical attention. Owing to the measures of the IMF and
similar institutions, the situation has grown worse instead of better. There are
countries in Latin America where 10 percent of the people earn more than 50
percent of the national income. How can one talk of democracy under these
conditions?
Fidel Castro Ruz, Interview: Fidel Castro, EL DIARo (NICARAGUA), June 4, 1992.
152. This idea is reflected in Western critiques of the IMF system as well. See, e.g.,
Tamara Lothian, The Criticism of the Third-World Debt and the Revision of Legal
Doctrine, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 421 (1995) ("The imposition of the IMF-style program
undermines economic sovereignty in the debtor countries by removing from the country's
internal control many of the chief tools of macroeconomic policy." Id. at 442).
153. Castro speaks of sovereign debt as touching on the great struggle for
independence among less developed states:
Because, how can one call a government or a nation independent that must go
every month to discuss with the IMF all of the things it must do in its own
territory? That amounts to a fictive independence, and we see this as a battle
for national liberation, that can truly unite, and for the first time in the history
of our Hemisphere, all social classes in a struggle to attain true independence.
FCR 1985 Speech, supra note 148 ("Porque, LC6mo puede llamarse independiente un
gobierno y un pais que tiene que ir todos los meses a discutir con el Fondo Monetario
Internacional lo que tiene que hacer en su casa? Es una ficci6n de independencia, y
nosotros vemos esto como una lucha de liberaci6n nacional, que puede agrupar de
verdad, y por primera vez en la historia de nuestro hemisferio, a todas las capas socials en
una lucha para alcanzar su verdadera independencia.").
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gunshot wounds in a context of severe national tension, an
unsupportable situation.
Castro would shift the balance of responsibility for loans to
creditors. In this respect, Castro's vision clearly reflects criticisms of
sovereign debt especially common in Latin America from the 1980s:
Throughout the 1980s, three standard objections were raised against
repayment of the debt: first, many of the debts were tainted by their
origins in the military regimes of the 1970s; second, the commercial
banks were largely responsible for the excessive borrowing of the
period; and third, full repayment of the loans would create intolerable
social hardship.
155
Reflecting this scholarship, Castro's discourse reflects a refinement
of this analysis at both a macro and micro level.
At the macro level, that shifting would involve the abandonment of
what Castro views as the anarchic global market finance system 156 in
favor of a control model of public finance, with control vested in an
organization reflecting the desires of the majority of the world's
population and grounded in principles of redistribution and public
obligation. This requires a union of Latin American and Caribbean states
similar to the European Union.1 57 This would make it easier to resist the
unitary standard for neo liberal subsidization of developed state wealth
through the imposition of global financial institution's one size fits all
formulas.
158
154. Id. ("Es inconcebible que los gobiemos de los procesos democraticos llamen a
las juerzas armadas a reprimir al pueblo para poder cobrar la deuda, y a matar a la gente
como materon en Santo Domingo, porque las medidas del Fondo Monetario Internacional
ya costaron mds de 100 vidas en Santo Domingo, mds de 400 heridos de balas y una
situaci6n de tension tremenda en el pais, una situaci6n insportable.").
155. Lothian, supra note 152, at 439.
156. Castro has described the current system as chaotic and anarchic at the global
level as a direct product of the policy of the International Monetary Fund. See FCR 1999
Speech, supra note 12, at 12 (describing the system of overproduction for export markets
as "fruits of the anarchy and chaos in the distribution of investment capital at a global
level pursuant to the generalized order to grow and develop on the basis of exports as the
IMF counsels") ("fruto de la anarquia y el caos en la distribuci6n de los capitals de
inversion a nivel mundial, bajo la consigna generalizada de crecer y desarrollarse a base
de exportaciones como aconseja el FMI.").
157. "First of all we have the need to unite Latin American communities without
wasting a second." Id. at 34. Castro suggests the importance of union to prevent the
United States from exploiting divisions between smaller Latin American states. Id. at 37-
38 ("Primero tenemos el deber de unimos los pueblos latinoamericanos sin perder
unminuto.").
158. Id. at 26 ("One can't treat states at different levels of development the same way.
One can't ignore inequalities between them. One can't apply the same formula for each.
One can't impose a single method. And regulatory and international economic
development formulas are worthless if their purpose is to exclusively benefit the richest
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At the micro level, the shifting to lenders would occur in a related
manner. When states fail, they ought to be treated like victims of
normative wrongs. A global equity standard, based on emerging
international standards of individual and state conduct, ought to be
applied. The focus is public rather than private, political and social
rather than economic, focused on output rather than on efficiencies in the
use of factors of production divorced from their socio-political context.
Thus, liability for the debt, and the other harms arising from or related to
the provision of the loan, ought to shift to the lender, at least to the extent
that the loan was used to commit or facilitate the commission of
violations of human rights, humanitarian laws or other international or
national violations of norms or laws.
This micro and macro approach reflects the hard lessons learned by
the Castro regime in its first years in power when it was held accountable
for the irresponsible actions of the predecessor regime. These events
ultimately resulted in Cuba pulling out of the IMF system and beginning
a half-century campaign for change. As explained by the IMF:
Cuba drew its gold tranche and its first credit tranche ($25 million)
from the Fund in September 1958, during the final months of the
collapsing regime of President Fulgencio Batista. The Fund
repeatedly agreed to postpone repayment after Fidel Castro took
power in 1959, until the five-year limit on outstanding drawings was
about to expire. The Managing Director issued a formal complaint in
September 1963 and initiated procedures that could have led to a
declaration that Cuba was ineligible to use Fund resources. That
process was aborted when Cuba withdrew from the Fund in 1964,
and the Castro government eventually repaid the money over the
remainder of the decade.
159
Alternatively, something like the rules of predatory lending liability,
currently emerging as an object of discussion in the U.S. and other states,
ought to form the basis of any approach to the responsibility of creditors
for the debtor state's obligations to pay their sovereign debts. 160 The
and most powerful states. The IMF like the WTO desire to start clean with them all."
Id.) ("No se puede tratar igual a todos paises, con muy distinctos niveles de desarrollo.
No se puede ignorar las desigualdades. No se puede aplicar una receta para todos. No se
puede imponer una sola via. Y de nada valen formulas para regular y desarrollar las
relaciones econ6micas internacionales si es para beneficiar exclusivamente a los mds
ricos y poderosos. Tanto el Fondo Monetario como la OMC, quieren hacer tabla rosa con
todo.").
159. International Monetary Fund, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE IMF 1979-1989 758
(Oct. 1, 2001) citing in part, J. Keith Horsefield, Chronicle, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, 1945-1965: TWENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
COOPERATION, 548-50 (J. Keith Horsefield, ed., 1969).
160. For a general discussion of predatory lending and the policy reasons for
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policy reasons for regulating, and even prohibiting such practices, are
fairly straightforward. They include avoiding a "debt trap" in which the
debtor becomes enmeshed in a series of loans with no realistic possibility
of repayment, forcing many into bankruptcy. 161 In the area of consumer
law, especially with respect to mortgages on real property, several states
have enacted laws regulating, or restricting, a number of practices.'
62
Many of these can be easily translated to the public law field and
specifically to sovereign lending, if one embraces the public law
character of sovereign debt and the overriding policy imperative of
development as articulated by Castro.
Castro has long suggested that the nature of IMF lending has some
elements that have come to be understood as predatory. 163 Indeed, for
Castro, the essential problem of sovereign debt within the context of the
neoliberal global order is that it is designed intentionally to make it
impossible for the state to extricate itself from debt, or from dependence
curtailing the practice, see, e.g., U.S. Departments of Housing and Urban Development
and Treasury, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending: A Joint Report, July 15,
2000, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/report3076.htm (last visited Feb.
22, 2006). Predatory lending practices and their regulations have been the subject of
recent Congressional investigation. See Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem,
Impact, and Response: Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 107th Cong. 1 (2001).
161. Commentators have suggested this likely outcome from a number of lending
practices, including, recently, the practice and terms of so-called payday loans. See, e.g.,
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004); Creola Jones,
Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1 (2002).
162. North Carolina's provision has been among the first and often copied provisions
in this area. See S.B. 1149, codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 24-1.1E, 24-10.2 (eff. July 1,
2000). Many of these rules were later preempted by federal legislation. See Therese G.
Franzen and Leslie M. Howell, Predatory Lending Legislation in 2004, 60 Bus. LAW.
677 (2005); Nicholas Bagley, Note: The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of
Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2274 (2004).
163. As early as 1979, Castro suggested:
You are statesmen who daily face the harsh tasks of your countries' economies.
You know very well what the enormous difficulties are-the constant increase
in the foreign debt; the scarcity of funds; the increasing cost of energy and
manufactured products; unequal trade; incessant and progressive robbery by
means of low prices on the foreign market for the products that are the fruit of
our peoples' sweat; inflation; increasing domestic prices; the blight of social
conflicts resulting from all of the foregoing. Progressive governments which
are carrying out a noble effort to achieve development and freedom for their
countries are crushed and, at times, apparently even overwhelmed by the
economic difficulties and the one sides and antipopular conditions imposed by
international loan organization. Haven't many of you had to pay a political
price because of IMF regulations? We Cubans, who have been excluded from
that institution by imperialist will, are not so sure now whether or not it
constituted punishment or a privilege.
Fidel Castro Ruz, Speech Sixth Summit Conference of the Nonaligned Countries
Movement, Havana, Cuba, Sept. 3, 1979, available at http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/
cuba/castro.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
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on the debtor. 164 State failure, a state's inability to pay sovereign debt,
thus ought to trigger an investigation to determine of the nature of the
debt, the conditions under which the debt was incurred and the equities
of continuing the obligation. In many cases, states should be free to
repudiate debt without further consequence.
1 65
Debt repudiation may also be based on notions of "odious debt."
166
The concept has gained some currency in the West as debtor-states seek
new bases for approaching their debt obligations short of a private law
based default, 167 and as the implications of a democracy based global
market system are tested.' 68 Most recently the concept has been applied
164. FCR 1985 Speech, supra note 148 ("We say: it is unpayable. But because it is
unpayable for mathematical or economic reasons does not implicate a moral, legal or
political judgment of the problem. But to that we also say: it is impossible as a political
matter. No government in Latin America is in a condition to comply with any of the
IMF's measures, not by blood or fire could they comply." Id.) ("Nosotros decimos: es
impagable. Pero impagable por rezones matemticas, econ6micas, no implica un juicio
moral del problema, o legal, o politico del problema. Pero nosotros decimos tambi6n: es
un imposible politico. Los gobiemos no estAn en condiciones, en ningfin pais de Am6rica
Latina, de aplicar esas medidas del Fondo Monetario, en ninguno; ni a sangre y fuego
pueden hacerlo.").
165. Fidel Castro Ruz, Intervenci6n del Comandenate Fidel Castro Ruz, Primer
Secretariodel Comite Central de Partido Comunista de Cuba y Presidente de los Consejos
de Estado y Ministros, en el IV Congreso de la FELAP, efectuado en el Palacio de las
Convenciones, en la tarde de 6 de Julio de 1985, "afho del tercer congreso," available at
http://wwwl.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) ("One
would have to be crazy now to seek internal unity in order to pay one's debt to the IMF;
internal unity not to pay! Indeed, we suggest more: when one hears: sacrifice to pay
one's debt, we say sacrifice for development is all that ought to be asked of the masses;
sacrifice to pay the debt, never!" Id.) ("Ahora para pagar esa deuda al Fondo Monetario,
habria que estar loco para pedir unidad intema; es unidad interna para no pagarla, iunidad
interna para no pagarla! Inclusos, nosotros planteamos mis. Cuando se dice: sacrificio
para pagar la deuda, nosotros decimos: sacrifio para el desarrollo si se les puede pedir a
las mases; sacrificios para pagar la deuda, ijamds!"). See also FCR 1985 Speech, supra
note 148 ("And if we see that within the enemy camp more than one member embraces
the idea of cancellation, why renounce the idea of cancellation?") ("Y si vemos que en las
filas enemigas empieza ya mis de uno a aceptar la idea de la cancelaci6n, ,por que
renunciar a la idea de la cancelaci6n de la deuda?").
166. For a discussion of the concept and calls for its application in various contexts,
see, e.g., PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD
WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165 (1991). Adams quotes ALEXANDER SACK, LES
EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS DETrES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES
OBLIGATIONS FNANCIIRES (1927) for an early statement of the idea: "If a despotic power
incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State, but to strengthen its despotic
regime, to repress the population that fights against it etc., this debt is odious for the
population of the State."
167. For a non-governmental organization with a website devoted to the issue, see
http://www.odiousdebts.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). For an argument that the concept
ought to be expanded and more broadly applied, see, e.g., Anupam Chander, Odious
Securitization, 53 EMORY L.J. 923 (2004).
168. For a review, see, e.g., Emily F. Mancina, Note: Sinners in the Hands of an
Angry God: Resurrecting the Odious Debt Doctrine in International Law, 36 GEO.
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
to the debt of Iraq under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein before
2003. 169
Castro provides a theoretical justification for the concept of "odious
debt" on a vastly expanded scale. The notion ought not to be limited to
successor states, or treated as a narrow argument bounded by the
legalisms of Western oriented international law. Instead, the notion must
be tied to the realities of lending at the international level and the
legitimacy of the government to which a loan is made. 170  Thus, even
where there is no issue of "successor state" to which the concept has
usually and traditionally limited, 17 ' the odious debt concept ought to
apply to determine the lender's complicity in subsidizing the government
of an illegitimate ruler and limiting the lender's ability to profit thereby,
especially after the overthrow and establishment of a legitimate state
apparatus. 1
72
Perversely, the rise of the possibility of repudiation on the basis of
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1239 (2004).
169. See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Sovereign Bankruptcy: In Re Germany (1953), In Re
Iraq (2004), 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 302 (2004) (referencing Seema Jayachandran & Michael
R. Kremer, A Dictator's Crippling Debt, HARV. MAG., July/Aug. 2003, at 30, and a
further listing of their relevant work at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/
kremer/papers.html.).
170. Fidel Castro Ruz, Latin America 's Foreign Debt Must Be Canceled, in FIDEL
CASTRO SPEECHES 1984-85: WAR AND CRISIS IN THE AMERICAS 206 (Michael Tabor, ed.,
1985) (text of interview of Fidel Castro Ruz conducted by Regino Diaz, editor of the
Mexican newspaper Excelsior, March 21, 1985) ("The military men are withdrawing
from public administration. If the economic situation had been less serious, they would
have resisted.... Now they have turned the state administration over to civilians and
have left them a terrible inheritance, to be sure." Id. at 211). Castro asserts that while the
civilian governments that succeeded military dictators cannot be held to blame for the
financial, and particularly the debt crises they inherited, military dictators can be held
liable. "Pinochet can be blamed for a large part of them, because of his fratricidal coup
and his enthusiastic contributions to and cooperation with that policy [IMF policy] for
nearly twelve years .... In short, as a rule, I should honestly say that all these aspects
make for a situation that escapes the control, the desires, and the wishes of government."
Id. at 219-20.
171. See, e.g., P.K. MENON, THE SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT To TREATIES,
STATE PROPERTY, ARCHIVES AND DEBTS 158-63 (1991); Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris,
State Succession to Debts and Assets: The Modern Law and Policy, 42 HARV. INT'L L.
REV. 355 (2001); Hubert Beemelmans, State Succession in International Law: Remarks
on Theory and State Praxis, 15 B.U. INT'L L. J. 71 (1997) (esp. notes 173-74).
172. "As a result of all of these mathematical calculations and moral, historical,
political and economic reflections, I have come to the conclusion that the Latin American
debt is unpayable and should be canceled. . . . I suggest that the industrialized creditor
countries can and should make themselves responsible for the debts of their own banks."
Fidel Castro Ruz, Latin America 's Foreign Debt Must Be Canceled, in FIDEL CASTRO
SPEECHES 1984-85: WAR AND CRISIS IN THE AMERICAS 206, 228 (Michael Tabor, ed.,
1985) (text of interview of Fidel Castro Ruz conducted by Regino Diaz, editor of the
Mexican newspaper Excelsior, March 21, 1985). This finds its echo in the work of some
commentators, for example, out of Africa. See, e.g., Chris N. Okeke, The Debt Burden:
An African Perspective, 35 INT'L LAW. 1489 (2001).
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an "odious debt" doctrine has made blanket debt forgiveness by creditor
nations somewhat more problematic. Debtor nations become suspicious
that such forgiveness offers are motivated solely by a creditor nation's
desire to avoid exposure of possible connections between creditor states
and governments implicated in violations of national or international
laws and norms.1 73 Moreover, forgiveness on these terms provides a
means for creditor states to retain power to control forgiveness, so that it
remains an extraordinary act controlled wholly by creditor states. Debtor
states are reduced to begging for debt forgiveness. And thus, forgiveness
on its current terms retains the hierarchies of power and dependence that
serve to perpetuate the power disparities between states.
The recent round of debt forgiveness at the insistence of the world's
richest nations in 2005 attest to the way in which debt forgiveness
reinforces the subordination of debtor states, and their dependence on the
largesse of creditor states. 174  In both cases, the impetus for debt
forgiveness came from the great creditor nations. The charitable nature
of the forgiveness was very much in evidence, from the control of the
nature, character, and terms of the forgiveness, to the expectations that
were imposed on those sovereigns whose debt was forgiven. 75  The
parallels to patterns of traditional almsgiving to the poor were striking.
176
In place of discussion of the way in which "welfare" makes the poor
irresponsible (an individual moral hazard problem), there is substituted a
rhetoric of state irresponsibility if they can escape the consequences of
their excessive borrowing. 177
173. For a discussion from the perspective of the IMF, see Jack Boorman, Dealing
Justly With Debt, Speech Given at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International
Affairs New York, Apr. 30, 2003, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/
2003/043003.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
174. See International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review, Legal and
Finance Departments, The G-8 Debt Cancellation Proposal and Its Implications for the
Fund, July 20, 2005, available at http://www.imf.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
175. Id. at 4-13. For an analysis of overall aid, including debt forgiveness prior to
2005, see Sanjeev Gupta, Catherine Pattillo, and Smita Wagh, Are Donor Countries
Giving More or Less Aid? IMF Working Paper No. WP/06/1 (Jan. 2006) available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wO601/pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). A
significant and adverse consequence of donor control is relief volatility. Donations are
made to maximize benefit to the donor rather than to maximize the benefit to the
recipient. "Some part of the higher volatility in recent years can be attributed to the
forgiveness of countries' debt, which, as one-off events, is inherently volatile." Id. at 20.
176. For a discussion of the dynamics of public charitable giving, see Larry Catdt
Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: The Futility of Ending Welfare as We Know It, 30
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1995); Larry Catd Backer, Medieval Poor Law in
Twentieth Century America: Looking Back Towards a General Theory of Modern
American Poor Relief, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 871 (1995).
177. See Ralph Chami, Sunil Shama and Ilhyock Shim, A Model of the IMF as a
Coinsurance Arrangement, June 1, 2004, paper delivered at Conference on "Dollars,
Debt and Deficits--60 Years After Bretton Woods," Banco de Espafia, Madrid, June 14-
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Castro's vision would reverse these relationships-stripping
creditor states of the power to control forgiveness. Under an anti-
corporatist vision, the processes of forgiveness is governed by
international standards that seek to serve the goals of reducing power
disparities between states and reduce the political, social, and cultural
effects of power disparities in the current regime of globalized financial
markets. That is, the goal of lending would be to foster development
targeting individual welfare through public programs, rather than
targeting indirect welfare increases through fostering markets. 1
78
A critical question in evaluating Castro's approach is the
importance of its Marxist overlay to the integrity of the analysis. Castro
argues that his vision is inextricable from his Marxist determinism.
179
The current system of neoliberal globalization has reached its highest
stage of development from which the contradictions inherent in it will
cause its collapse. That collapse will be marked by profound and
catastrophic crises.' 80 The crises will provide the basis for successful
resistance and the implementation of the next (and last?) stage of
globalization, "which could not be than solidarity, socialist, communist,
or whatever else you want to call it.' 18 1  This transformation is
objectively inevitable and without alternative. 182  For Americans, of
course, this doctrinal Marxist gloss is off-putting. Old school doctrinal
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy is at best on the defensive since the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the turn of China to Marxist-Leninist market
strategies. But can Castro's analysis be sustained without its Marxist
determinist overlay? Castro suggests that it can, but only because the
course of ideas are inevitable and the problem is the neither Marxism nor
socialism, but the success of the American propaganda machine to distort
the meaning of those ideas.' 83 But that is hardly an answer. And Castro
can be particularly ambiguous when the necessity arises, especially in the
context of developing and marketing his ideas. 
184
15, 2004, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/res/seminars/2004/60/sharma.pdf
(last accessed January 6, 2006).
178. For an example of arguments suggesting this approach, see, e.g., Obijiofor
Aginam, Between Isolationism and Mutual Vulnerability: A South-North Perspective on
Global Governance of Epidemics in an Age of Globalization, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 297
(2004).
179. FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 58.
180. Id. at 59.
181. Id. ("No podria ser otra que solidaria, socialista, comunista, o como ustedes
quieran llamarla.").
182. Id.
183. Id. at 4-5.
184. In an ironic twist, Castro has served as a model for American military thinking.
For an excellent American analysis of the power of ambiguity in the propaganda front of
a military campaign, using Castro as a model, see Russell J. Hampsey, Voices From the
[Vol. 24:3
2006] IDEOLOGIES OF GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGN DEBT 547
Castro's old fashioned, Stalinist Marxism, tends to provide a basis
for an easy dismissal of his perspectives-no more so than in the context
of sovereign debt and the character of the state. After 1989, many
assumed that Marxism was dead as a potent basis for global
harmonization. Indeed, it is easy to dismiss an aging Stalinist who may
well have lost touch even with China, the current great Marxist-Leninist
superpower. 85 But the death of Marxism as a political ideology has not
necessarily resulted in the disappearance of its economic theory or of
those who still believe in its form of analysis, now reconstituted as parts
of the doctrinal underbelly of any number of anti-globalization or anti-
corporatist or free market ideas advanced by Western states. 186 Castro
himself has always been clear that Marxism might be best advanced
among the people on the sly-advancing its ideas without labeling those
ideas with the ideological brand name "Marxism."'
87
The death of Marxism as a state ideology seems to have permitted
its dispersal rather than its elimination from political discourse. Castro
reminds us of the origins of the "Marxism recycled" in which the ideas
expressed by Castro also serve other groups. 88 It should come as no
surprise that Castro provides at least symbolic support for a large number
of leftist and anti-globalization elements of civil society in the West and
in developing states. But the ideas articulated by Castro also find
significant echo in the positions and rhetoric from a number of public
and private sectors, most of which have no formal connection to
Marxism, and indeed have constituted some of political Marxism's
greatest enemies. His ideas on sovereign debt, reconstituted in perhaps
less politically inflammatory terms, finds equally strong expression in the
work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Geneva, and pronouncements of the Roman Catholic Church, both
highly influential actors in global socio-political discourse.
Nor is Castro necessarily the most sophisticated or influential
proponent of the ideas he expresses. Certainly, in Latin America, Castro
Sierra Maestra: Fidel Castro's Revolutionary Propaganda, MILITARY REv. 93 (Nov.-
Dec. 2002) available at http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/English/NovDec02/
indxnd02.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). "Incidentally, the program Castro successfully
executed parallels current U.S. PSYOP doctrine, illustrating the soundness of these
principles." Id.
185. For a discussion of the differences in approaches between Cuba and China, see
Larry Catd Backer, Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: Cuban Marxism,
Private Economic Collectives, and Free Market Globalism, 14 TRANSNATIONAL LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 381-403 (2004).
186. See, e.g., GEORGE ALLEN COHEN, HISTORY, ETHICS, MARXISM (1995) (proposing
methods through which Marxist and socialist objectives can be attained in a post-Marxist
world).
187. See FCR 1999 Speech, supra note 12, at 4-5.
188. See P. VAN PARJIS, MARXISM RECYCLED (1993).
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represents only one of a large number of voices, many of them academic
voices, all proceeding along the same lines. The most influential current
expression of that wave of academic and civil society approaches from
out of Latin America is the World Social Forum.1 89 Like Castro, this
umbrella organization, centered on a series of meetings originating in
Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2001,90 is grounded in opposition to the
normative structure of Western economic and political theory.' 9' Like
Castro, these elements of civil society work to "delegitimize the logic of
the system on which globalization is based and reconstruct utopia as the
ethical and political touchstone of our action for change,"'' 92 but are not
necessarily doctrinally Marxist-Leninist organizations.'
93
It is becoming increasingly clear that the ideas expressed by Castro
have also come to be incorporated, at least in some respects, by a new
generation of democratically elected leaders in Latin America. "The left
is undergoing an extraordinary rebirth throughout the continent; Castro's
survival, Chdvez's rise, the prospect that the next president of Mexico
will be Andrrs Manuel L6pez Obrador, the leftist mayor of Mexico City,
and the stunning trajectory of Morales himself [in Bolivia] all testify to
189. According to its website,
The World Social Forum is an open meeting place where social movements,
networks, NGOs and other civil society organizations opposed to neo-
liberalism and a world dominated by capital or by any form of imperialism
come together to pursue their thinking, to debate ideas democratically, for
formulate proposals, share their experiences freely and network for effective
action.
World Social Forum, What the World Social Forum is, Aug. 22, 2002, available at
http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id-menu= 19&cd-language=2 (last
visited Mar. 2, 2006).
190. See World Social Forum, Origins and Aims, June 22, 2004, available at
http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id-menu=2_1 &cd-language=2 (last
visited Mar. 2, 2006).
191. See Susan George, Another World is Possible, Aug. 24, 2002, available at
http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/dinamic/eng-lbal3.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2006)
(Part of Opinions of the 2001 World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, Brazil) ("This combat
is really between those who want inclusive globalization based on cooperation and
solidarity and those who want the market to make all the decisions.").
192. World Social Forum, Methodology, Methodology of WSF 2004, Draft Proposal:
Criteria for Programming the Work of the World Social Forum Process for 2004, Oct. 10,
2003, available at http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?idmenu=
5_3&cdlanguage=2 (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
193. See id. ("We are diverse as movements, organizations, networks, coalitions and
campaigns; diverse in our approaches, diagnoses and analyses; diverse in our proposals
and strategies; and diverse in our experiences."). According to its Charter of Principles,
"The World Social Forum is a plural, diversified, non-confessional, non-governmental
and non-party context that, in a decentralized fashion, interrelates organizations and
movements engaged in concrete action at levels from the local to the international to
build another world." World Social Forum, Charter of Principles, June 8, 2002, available
at http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id-menu=4&cd-language=2 (last
visited Mar. 1, 2006).
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that fact ... [b]ut it is also a product of the wider popular mood in
Bolivia and, for that matter, in much of contemporary Latin America."'
194
These leaders have begun to internalize the vision expressed by Castro
within the states they lead. 195 They are also increasingly using their
positions to significantly stymie American economic policy in Latin
America. Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan President, used the media
flamboyantly to convey a message of anti-Americanism, and anti-
Washington Consensus type "neoliberalism" very similar to the type
elaborated by Castro during the November 2005 summit meeting of the
Organization of American States. 196  The United States, entering this
OAS summit with high hopes of securing progress on cobbling together
a Free Trade Area of the Americas, walked away with nothing.' 97 "The
194. David Rieff, Che's Second Coming?: The Indian Leader of a Coca-Growers'
Movement Wants to Make Bolivia the Next Domino in Latin America's Revolt Against
Globalization, Neoliberalism, and the Bush Administration, THE N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,
Nov. 20, 2005, 72, 74-75. The connection between newly elected leader Morales of
Bolivia, and Chdvez and Castro are likely to be deep. Morales had "denied any particular
affinity with either regime, there is no doubt that these two 'radical' leaders are the ones
to whom he has turned time and again for advice. Certainly, Hugo Chdvez has made no
secret of the sympathy he feels for Morales' campaign, while the state run Cuban press
has lavished a great deal of attention on Morales." Id. at 76-77.
195. Many on the American political right have made this claim for years-a claim
that Chavez has not necessarily rejected. See, e.g., William S. Prillaman, The Castro in
Caracas: Venezuelan Strongman Hugo Chavez in Fidel's Image, 55(6) NAT'L REv.
(Apr. 7, 2003) (noting that, in at least one 2003 speech, Chavez "blamed the country's
woes on the United States, the international capitalist system, Venezuela's 'rotten
oligarchy' and 'squalid elites,' bankers, coup plotters in Miami, 'savage neoliberalism,'
bad weather, and the recent shortage of full moons"); Steve Bonta, Castro's Stooge in
Latin America: Though Ousted By a Recent Coup, Venezuela's Marxist President Hugo
Chavez was Brought Back to Power by His Goon Squads-the Bolivian Circles-With a
Little Help From Cuba, 18 THE NEW AM. (May 20, 2002). More generally, some
American commentators have noted:
Today, the models of democracy and free market economics so popular at the
beginning of the decade are increasingly criticized across Latin America.
Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez owes his popularity to his image as a
revolutionary populist. Chavez's message, that the democratic system in its
current state was hopelessly corrupt and unresponsive to the real concerns of
the public, struck a chord across Latin America. In the eyes of many Latin
Americans, democracy-or at least democratic politicians-have done little to
address the poverty, social inequalities, and lack of development that plague
their nations.
JOSEPH S. TULCHIN & RAPH H. ESBACH, Latin America in the New International System:
A Call for Strategic Thinking, in LATIN AMERICA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 1,
15(2001).
196. TULCHIN & ESBACH, supra note 195, at 74 ("At the summit meeting of the
Organization of American States held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, earlier this month,
[Morales of Bolivia] appeared with Chdvez at a huge anti-American and anti-
globalization rally just before the meetings began. The two men spoke in front of a huge
image of Che Guevara. This is symbolic politics, but it is more than that, too.").
197. No Trade Deal at the Americas Summit: Leaders of 34 Nations From Across the
Americas Have Failed to Find a Compromise on a Regional Free Trade Zone At Their
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
nations of the Mercosur took a stand against renewing FTAA talks to
declare their opposition to free trade agreements along the NAFTA
model that do not take into account the needs of developing countries
while locking in competitive advantages for developed nations."
'198
But Latin America is not the only place where this form of
resistance to IMF type norm structures is being cultivated successfully.
As important, perhaps, by two communities neither connected neither to
doctrinal Marxist-Leninist institutions nor to the Cuban state apparatus-
the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights and
the Roman Catholic Church. It is in this form, that the ideas expressed
by Castro becomes of more concern to the United States and others
advocating the dominant approach to globalization and sovereign debt
within that broad context.
The work of the United Nations Human Rights Commission and its
staff in Geneva is from time to time infused with the language of
opposition to neoliberalism that suggests an affinity to the spirit of
Castro's vision. It has not always been successful in finding ways of
implementing these understandings into international law.199 The recent
attempt to impose a system of mandatory obligations on transnational
corporations serves as an example of the way in which regulatory
frameworks within the U.N. now derive from the vision articulated by
Castro. The focus of the efforts in this respect was not on contractual
relationships, nor on efficiency of markets as regulatory mechanisms, but
rather on worker rights ands development. For these points of focus, the
modem transnational corporation could be constructed as nothing more
than a means to a socially acceptable end. Thus, for example, an
influential report introduces the subject from the viewpoint of
maximization of worker welfare maximization rather than from the more
traditional perspective of contract holder rights.200  Like states, it is
Summit in Argentina, BBC News, Nov. 6, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/americas/4410190.stm (last visited Jan. 2, 2006).
198. Laura Carlsen, Timely Demise for Free Trade Area of the Americas,
International Relations Center Americas Program Commentary, Nov. 23, 2005, available
at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/2954 (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). The International
Relations Center is a policy studies institute based in Silver City New Mexico, the
mission of which is to "make the U.S. a more responsible member of the global
community by promoting progressive strategic dialogues that lead to new citizen-based
agendas." IRC, Mission Statement, available at http://www.irc-online.org/about.php
(last visited Jan. 5, 2006).
199. For a discussion of what will likely be the latest failed attempt-the imposition
of Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations, see Backer, supra note
21.
200. "Today's economic and financial systems are organized in such a way as to act
as pumps that suck up the output of the labour of the toiling masses and transfer it, in the
form of wealth and power, to a privileged minority." United Nations, Economic and
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important for international institutions to "consider how we are going to
manage the development and proliferation of transnational corporations
to the benefit of all." 20 1 The proposed Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With
Regard to Human Rights '202 elaborates a fundamental principle of
corporate governance-that corporate activity must be directed to the
encouragement of social progress and development, rather than
shareholder wealth maximization.20 3  In a related vein, the United
Nations Human Rights Commission began exploring the possibility of
creating an enforcement vehicle for the obligations of states and others to
protect economic, social and cultural rights.
20 4
Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Realization of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: The Question of Transnational Corporations, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/6,
June 10, 1998, at 1 (working document on the impact of the activities of transnational
corporations on the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, prepared by Mr. El
Hadji Guis, pursuant to Sub-Commission resolution 1977/11).
201. Id. at 8.
202. United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With
Regard to Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.8 (7 Aug. 2003) available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/Documents?OpenFrameset. The Norms
were subsequently revised, see Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (dated 26 Aug. 2003, resolution adopted 13 Aug. 2003),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/0/64155e7e8141b38cc
1256d63002c55e8?OpenDocument. All references to the Norms are to the revised
Norms issued August 26, 2003 [hereafter the Norms]. For the official commentary on the
Norms, see United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Regard to Human
Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (26 Aug. 2003) ]hereafter the Norms Commentary].
For a report on the finalization of the statement of norms, see United Nations Economic
and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, Report of the Sessional Working Group on the Working
Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations on its fifth session,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/13, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/
Documents?OpenFrameset.
203. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.1/Add.2 at 10 Comment (a). The Commentary
was added in 2001 after the Sessional Working Group agreed to radically shorten the
guidelines into a form of general principles. "Commentaries were added to make more
specific reference to the relevant international standards." See United Nations, Economic
and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report of the
Sessional Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational
Corporations on its Third Session, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/9 (Aug. 14, 2001), at 6-7.
204. For a useful discussion, see, e.g., Michael J. Dennis, David P. Stewart,
Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should There be an International
Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?,
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Indeed, this idea of development as a public law function of
economic institutions has added weight in the context of state action-
and particularly the approach to be taken by the community of nations to
the debt burdens of the less developed states. The United Nations Office
of the Secretariat has recently endorsed a report suggesting the need for
the wealthier states to begin wealth transfer programs for the benefit of
less developed states. 20 5 This reflects years of so-called "North-South"
dialog on development as a foundational principle of international
cooperation, 6 superior to the imperatives of market economics, and
limiting the utility of the private loan model to state debt.20 7
The Roman Catholic Church has long embraced a variant of this
vision. American writers on Catholic social thought have articulated this
variant focusing on the obligations of corporations and individuals in
society. Much of the Vatican's concerns were expressed in the context
of the financial crises of Latin American and Asian states in the late
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462 (2004).
205. United Nations, Office of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary General of the
United Nations for Decision by the Heads of State and Government in September 2005,
available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/.
206. See generally, Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 68-72 (1999) (suggesting a
connection between human rights as articulated after the Second World War and
development as currently conceived); ANJA LINDROOS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
(1999) (legal and political analysis underlying assertions of obligation to aid in
development).
207. Thus, for example, the followings statement nicely states the proposition with
respect to the importance of development as now appropriately understood under the
1986 United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development:
The Declaration on the Right to Development approaches development in
broad and comprehensive terms, as a multidimensional and global process
encompassing the economic, social, cultural, civil, and political spheres which
are interdependent and complementary. It underlies a number of important
principles on which development must be based including equality, non-
discrimination, solidarity, self-reliance and social justice Respect for these
principles cannot be waived even in the short term. The progress sought is not
just economic and financial efficiency and an improvement in the main
macroeconomic indicators, but one that can be measured in terms of social
justice, equality, well-being and respect for the fundamental dignity of all
individuals, groups and peoples."
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report to the
Secretary General: The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Impact
of the Activities and Working Methods of Transnational Corporations on the Full
Enjoyment of all Human Rights, in Particular Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the Right to Development, Bearing in Mind Existing International Guidelines, Rules and
Standards Relating to the Subject Matter, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/12 (July 2, 1996), at 110.
Compare the language of Fidel Castro in this point: see Fidel Castro Ruz, Cuba no
negocia ni vende su Revoluci6n, in FIDEL CASTRO Ruz, DE SEATTLE AL 11 DE SEPTIEMBRE
69, 74 (2002).
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1990s. Thus, for example, John Paul II suggested that "Christians will
have to raise their voice on behalf of all the poor of the world, proposing
the Jubilee as an appropriate time to give thought, among other things, to
reducing substantially, if not canceling outright, the international debt
which seriously threatens the future of many nations.' '20 8 John Paul II,
like Castro, suggests a "critical analysis of the world economic order, in
its positive and negative aspects, so as to correct the present order, and
that they would propose a system and mechanisms capable of ensuring
an integral and concerted development of individuals and peoples.,
20 9
Like Castro, John Paul II would have sought a recasting of the current
global economic system away from markets and toward development
and "social justice., 210 These views are echoed by American prelates as
well. 2 11 Like Castro, John Paul II was no friend of the consumerism that
formed an integral part of the global economic system contributing, in
some measure, to the need to borrow by states least able to afford the
debt.21 2 But The Catholic Church views the adoption of this vision as an
208. John Paul II, Ecclesia In America, (Apostolic Exhortation: To the Bishops,
Deacons, and Priests), available at http://www.vatican.valindex.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2006) ("Once more I express the hope [that] through study and dialogue with
representatives of the First World and with the leaders of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, will seek ways of resolving the problem of the foreign debt
and produce guidelines that would prevent similar situations from recurring on the
occasion of future loans.").
209. Id.
210. "The cry of millions upon millions of poor and marginalized people in our Latin
American and Caribbean societies due to this unjust economic system with its 'face of
suffering' (S.D. 179), must be heard by the Church in the Americas, and must be cased
with evangelical courage, and a desire to promote, for everyone's benefit, this 'new
international socio-economic order' based on solidarity and justice." SYNODUS
EPISCOPORUM BULLETIN of the Commission for information of the SPECIAL ASSEMBLY
FOR AMERICA OF THE SYNOD OF BISHOPS 16 November- 12 December 1997.
211. "Another reason we care is that the most vulnerable people in society were not
responsible for contracting the debt, yet they pay the price for it. Some countries used
borrowed funds to finance their militaries or projects benefiting the elites rather than for
projects that would have benefited the poor. Poor people suffer the most by the diversion
of scarce resources to debt repayments from human development." United States
Bishops, Jubilee, That's Why We Care About International Debt, (June 2000), available
at http://www.vatican.va/phome-en.htm) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). Cf., Synod of
Bishops, Special Assembly for America, Instrumentum Laboris, Encounter With the
Living Jesus Christ: The Way to Conversion, Communion and Solidarity in America
(1997), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/synod/documents/
rc_synod doc 01091997_usa-instrlabor en.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
212. In the entire American continent, there are indications of the difference
mentioned by Pope John Paul II in his Encyclical Letter Redemptoris missio: "the North
has constructed (a development model) which is now spreading to the South, where a
sense of religion as well as human values are in danger of being overwhelmed by a wave
of consumerism." Various answers point to the urgent need to find a solution to the
problem of the foreign debt in the context of the celebration of the Great Jubilee of the
Year 2000, as proposed by the Holy Father in his Apostolic Letter Tertio millenio
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aspect of conversion to Christian, that is, Catholic, universalism. 21 3 And
so, like Castro, within his system, the Roman Catholic Church must
continue to witness it faith in it economic and social justice
manifestations:
In the next two years, we plan to do a lot of work on the debt issue.
We will continue to press the World Bank, IMF, and US government
for more substantial relief for the countries that qualify under the new
initiative. We will work with CRS' partners in Africa and Latin
America who want to do their own work on debt. We will also
support more exchanges of bishops and clergy from countries that are
deeply indebted.
2 14
Like Castro, elements of the Catholic hierarchy have suggested a
greater lender responsibility for sovereign debt, especially to less
developed states in which the ruling institutions might not be totally free
of corruption or entirely legitimate. 5  The Catholic Church has
adveniente." Synod of Bishops, Special Assembly for America, Instrumentumn Laboris,
Encounter With the Living Jesus Christ: The Way to Conversion, Communion and
Solidarity in America (1997), available at http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/
synod/documents/rc.synod doc_01091997_usa-instrlaboren.html (last visited Mar. 2,
2006).
213. Thus, the issue of sovereign debt has been conceived as forming a part of a total
conversion:
Certain economic systems and policies exist which control the commercial
market and affect the financial matter of loans and interests, generating in some
cases an enormous debt for nations and impeding the development of peoples.
There are also certain types of economic aid dependent on the ideologies of
small political groups, various people in power and nations which are not
always governed by the criteria of equity and solidarity, but rather by selfish
interests. Such conditions call for conversion, especially as they relate to the
economic inequality between the northern and southern areas of the continent.
The situation calls out to faith and to conscience-both human and Christian-
for a response.
Synod of Bishops, Special Assembly for America, Encounter With the Living Jesus
Christ: The Way to Conversion, Community and Solidarity in America: Lineamenta,
available at http ://www.vatican.va/romancuria/synod/documents/rc-synod-
doc_01081996_usa-lineam en.html, at 25 (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
214. United States Bishops, Jubilee, That's Why We Care About International Debt,
(June 2000), available at http://www.vatican.va/phomeen.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2006).
215. Thus, for example, the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace Trade,
Development and the Fight Against Poverty suggested that:
Among the causes which have helped to create massive external debt are not
only high interest rates, caused by speculative financial policies, but also the
irresponsibility of people in government who, in incurring debt, have given too
little thought to the real possibility of repaying it. This has been aggravated by
the fact that huge sums obtained through international loans sometimes go to
enrich individuals instead of being used to pay for the changes needed for the
country's development. At the same time, it would be unjust to impose the
burden resulting from these irresponsible decisions upon those who did not
[Vol. 24:3
2006] IDEOLOGIES OF GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGN DEBT 555
indicated a willingness to embrace a form of Castro's subsidy argument
about neo liberal global trade and its effects on developing states as
216borrowers. A Roman Catholic Church official has stated, for example,
that
Another reason we care is that the most vulnerable people in society
were not responsible for contracting the debt, yet they pay the price
for it. Some countries used borrowed funds to finance their militaries
or projects benefiting the elites rather than for projects that would
have benefited the poor. Poor people suffer the most by the diversion
of scarce resources to debt repayments from human development.
2 17
At the same time, the Catholic hierarchy has been very careful to
curb political expression of its moral stances. The Catholic Church
firmly restrained the "liberation theology" popular with Latin American
religious during the 1970s and 1980s. 218 The current Pontiff, Benedict
XVI, as Cardinal Ratzinger, was crucial in that effort. He made a
distinction between Marxist elements of liberation theology-which he
considered an error within the traditions of the Roman Catholic faith,
though an alluring one2 19-and the traditional and doctrinally appropriate
make them.
Bishop Diarmud Martin, Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace Trade, Development
and the Fight against Poverty, Report (Nov. 18, 1999), available at
http://www.vatican.va/phome-en.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
216. See id. But, unfortunately, "the international trade system today frequently
discriminates against the products of the young industries of the developing countries and
discourages the producers of raw materials," as noted by Pope John Paul II in the 1980s
(Encyclical Letter Sollicitudo rei socialis, N.43).... The trends in primary commodity
trade, access to world markets and diversification of production have a decisive impact
on developing countries, affecting the balance of payments, foreign debt, domestic
budget and the success of savings and investment policies." Id.
217. Cardinal Etchegaray, Speech: Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, (June 9-
10, 2000), available at http://www.vatican.va/phomeen.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006)
(this speech was given during the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, with the
support of the Adenauer Foundation, organized a seminar, in Rome on June 9 and 10,
which gathered the leaders of international financial institutions (World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Bank for Development), the presidency of
the Latin American Bishops' Conference and representatives of the US and German
Bishops' Conferences).
218. See GUSTAvo GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION (1973).
219. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Liberation Theology, Preliminary Notes, (1984),
available at http://www.christendom-awake.org/pages/ratzinger/liberationtheol.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2006). Specifically, as Cardinal Ratzinger, Pope Boniface explained:
In trying to arrive at an overall evaluation it must be said that, if one accepts the
fundamental assumptions which underlie liberation theology, it cannot be
denied that the whole edifice has an almost irresistible logic. By adopting the
position of biblical criticism and of a hermeneutics that grows through
experience, on the one hand, and of the Marxist analysis of history, on the
other, liberation theologians have succeeded in creating a total picture of the
Christian reality, and this total view seems to respond fully both to the claims
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concern for the poor.220 And here, perhaps, can be found the best answer
to the question posed: at least within Roman Catholic institutional
doctrinal thought Castro's vision in opposition to neo-liberalism exist
outside of Castro's personal Marxist-Leninist ideological framework.
Benedict XVI has suggested for years that it can.221 As Ratzinger stated:
An analysis of the phenomenon of liberation theology reveals that it
constitutes a fundamental threat to the faith of the Church ... [i]n
denouncing error and pointing to dangers in liberation theology, we
must always be ready to ask what truth is latent in the error and how
it can be given its rightful place, how it can be released from error's
monopoly.222
Castro's influence is not necessarily limited to direct or indirect
effect on the development of the normative approach to global
economics. Whatever the direct or indirect connection between the
development of Castro's understanding of emerging global capital
markets, including markets in sovereign debt, and the very similar
understanding advanced by institutions of the United Nations and official
elements of the Roman Catholic Church, that view remains vibrant and
influential. To an increasing extent, the vision also fuels an ever more
vocal aspect of domestic so-called civil society opinion. A number of
influential Western based, non-governmental organizations, have started
speaking in terms similar to those used by Castro in attempts to influence
both international discourse and domestic political discourse on
development in general and sovereign debt in particular.223 In this sense,
of science and to the moral challenges of our time, urging people to make
Christianity an instrument of concrete world transformation; it seems to have
united Christianity, in this way, with all the "progressive forces" of our era.
Id.
220. See Edward A. Lynch, The Retreat of Liberation Theology, HOMILETIC &
PASTORAL REVIEW 12-21 (Feb. 1994) available at http://www.catholicculture.org/
docs/docview.cfm?recnum-643. Professor Lynch notes that "[o]pponents of liberation
theology have incorporated their struggle against this particular philosophy into a more
general attack on secularism, societal disunity and a culture confined to addressing
economic conflict. The approach has been quite successful." Id.
221. For the official pronouncement, see Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
Instruction on Certain Aspects of the "Theology of Liberation," available at
http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc con-cfaith-doc_1
9840806_theology-liberation-en.htnl (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). Part VII offers a
critique of Christian Marxism. In particular, there was a concern for the inevitable link
between Marxist ideology and totalitarianism. See id. at VII.7.
222. Ratzinger, supra note 219.
223. Sungjoon Cho described the embrace by American and other Western NGOs,
Greenpeace, Oxfam, and others, of the rhetoric of development and the position of the
developing states in the context of WTO negotiations. See Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too
Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun and the Future of
Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 235-237 (2004).
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Castro's effect may strike right at the heart of internal American (and
other Western) politics. This would be a great irony, indeed.
IV. Conclusion
This article has examined two very different visions of state debt
and the obligations that such debt may give rise to among both creditors
and debtors. It has explored the implications of each for the shape and
character of international regulation, and of the state as an actor in the
context of the emerging global system of economic and political
regulation. It now appears clear that the issue of sovereign debt, its
character and effect, is really part of a much larger issue touching on the
nature and character of the nation-states in general and debtor states in
particular, and of the global system that maintains the market for such
transactions.
When Frantz Fanon looked out on the world in the late 1950s, he
experienced hierarchy as a direct and very physical force. From this he
was able to articulate a psychology of the brute and her victim that has
been embraced by the developing world. 24  The contours of that
violently divided world were easy to discern: the world was divided
among a small number of states exercising direct authority or control
over large parts of the world for their own benefit.22 5 As Fidel Castro
looks out on the world at the beginning of the 21 st century, he sees a
world much changed in form and little changed in fact. The psychology
of the relationships between nations has not changed, only its
manifestations are different. Embracing the language of Fanon, Castro
suggests that in place of the relationship between colonizer/exploiter and
subordinate peoples characterized by direct application of brute force are
the financiers and their client states, whose relationship is bounded by
the market and the rule of law. The nation, as a nexus of private
relations, is substituted for the state, which served as the public
224. Among his most often referenced works in this regard are FRANTZ FANON,
BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam Markmann, trans., 1991( 1967), FRANTZ
FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (Constance Farrington, trans., 1968), FRANTZ
FANON, TowARD THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION, POLITICAL ESSAYS (Haakon Chevalier,
trans., 1967).
225. Franz Fanon suggested:
Colonial domination, because it is total and tends to over-simplify, very soon
manages to disrupt in spectacular fashion the cultural life of a conquered
people. This cultural obliteration is made possible by the negation of national
reality, by new legal relations introduced by the acquiring power, by the
banishment of the natives and their customs to outlying districts by colonial
society, by expropriation, and by the systematic enslaving of men and women.
Frantz Fanon, Reciprocal Bases of National Culture and the Fight for Freedom, Speech
to Congress of Black African Writers (1959), reproduced in THE WRETCHED OF THE
EARTH.
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manifestation of the sovereign will of a political community. The state is
reconceived as a sort of super body corporate, the manifestation in
institutional form of an infinite number of contractual relations among its
stakeholders. The theory of the firm226 is thus generalized as the public
law of states and as a fundamental requisite for state governance
policy.22 7 The international system thus continues to serve as a site for
subordination-a routinized and institutionalized hierarchy of states
whose purpose is to maintain the advantages of the states at the top of the
hierarchy.
The view from the United States was different in the 1950s. The
need to create and maintain a system of common values and
interconnectivity drove a new American internationalism that prized
those American values that helped this country emerge triumphant from
the Second World War.
In the twentieth century sovereign lending routinely involved
violations of Westphalian autonomy. International financial
institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, have institutionalized and routinized practices that are
inconsistent with Westphalian autonomy. These institutions do not
simply offer funds on the condition that they are repaid; they extend
resources only if borrowers are willing to accept changes in their
domestic policies and often institutional structures as well ...
Conditionality attached to loans from international financial
institutions was initially supported by the United States but resisted at
Bretton Woods by the representatives of European and Latin
American states, who correctly assumed that they would be the
targets of policies that were heavily influenced by American decision
makers. Ultimately the Americans succeeded in having
conditionality written into the Articles of Agreement of the fund
because the United States was the only source of significant capital in
the 1950s.
2 28
Little has changed from the perspective of the International
226. The theory of the firm attempts an explanation of the phenomena of the tendency
to amalgamate capital and operate through juridical entities in market systems. For an
early and classic description of the issue and an approach to explanation, see Ronald H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 388 (1937). See generally, OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 82-105 (1985); Michael L.
Wachter and Edward B. Rock, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1624-40 (2001).
227. For a modem application in the reconstruction of the economic policies of the
former Communist states and recently liberated states in the Middle East and Central
Asia, see Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (2004).
228. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 84-85 (1999).
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Monetary Fund 229 at the beginning of the 2 1st century. "IMF-supported
programs are intended to help a country adopt policies that will help it
regain market confidence and thereby have access to private capital,
which are essential for growth and jobs., 230 These policies are meant to
foster independence and full participation in global systems of economic
activity on an equal basis.231 "Corrective policies will restore investor
confidence, so that capital will once again flow into the country. This
should not be seen as "favoring" bankers and elites. 23 2 The international
system thus seeks to serve the citizens of every state equally by
providing them, through their political communities, with the means
necessary to compete in the global marketplace on equal terms. This sort
of competition requires adjustment of state practices for the benefit of the
many. The international system thus provides the greatest hope against
subordination. For this purpose, the availability of money, and social,
political and economic discipline, provide the foundation for the
internationalization of the good life for the planet's individuals.
Yet for all their differences, presently it seems that for both the IMF
and Castro, the "question is not whether to embrace one or the other but
how best to find the appropriate mixture. 233  The IMF system is
grounded on Western notions of contract and private property. The state,
like a corporation, is increasingly viewed as the nexus of complex
amalgamations of contracts among stakeholders in a political community
229. "The IMF is an international organization of 184 member countries. It was
established to promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and
orderly exchange arrangements; to foster economic growth and high levels of
employment; and to provide temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease
balance of payments adjustment." International Monetary Fund, About the IMF,
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/about.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). "The
International Monetary Fund was established by international treaty in 1945 to help
promote the health of the world economy." International Monetary Fund, What is the
International Monetary Fund, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/
exrp/what.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). The IMF "aims to prevent crises in the
[international monetary] system by encouraging countries to adopt sound economic
policies; it is also-as its name suggests-a fund that can be tapped by members needing
temporary financing to address balance of payments problems." Id.
230. International Monetary Fund, Common Criticisms of the IMF: Some Responses,
Mar. 25, 2005, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/ccrit/eng/crans.htm#be.
"The IMF and the rest of the official community (the World Bank, individual
governments) face a choice between helping a country in a crisis situation or cutting off
support for the country." Id.
231. "It's true that the bulk of the IMF's financial resources are provided by the G-7,
but decisions on policy and country matters are made by consensus among IMF
shareholders." Id.
232. Id. "If a county adopts corrective policies that will help put it on a sustainable
path in the long-term, the IMF supports a country because cutting off financing would
worsen the situation, and the poor would be particularly hard hit." Id.
233. Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?, 50
WASH.& LEE L. REV. 1673, 1696 (1993).
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whose individual and collective contract arrangements overlap the state
and other private amalgamations of economic, social, and political
power. In a world in which entities are proxies for systems of self-
referencing contracts, the debt of sovereigns, like the debt of other
amalgamations of things, is just another form of contract, and should be
subject to the same sets of uniform rules for enforcement. The object is
not necessarily the preservation of a particular quantum of state power or
dignity; the public character of the community is irrelevant. The critical
consideration is the contract itself; the contract must be honored absent
overreaching or fraud by lenders. The object of all action is not to
preserve a particular character of the state, but to strengthen the systems
viewed as the basis for maximizing the wealth, in the aggregate, of
individuals, either at a macro level-when measured collectively and on
a global basis or on a micro level-when measured within states or sub-
state communities. States, like corporations, NGOs and other entities
serve best when they help produce or maintain the greatest efficiency of
markets for transactions of all kinds---economic, political, social and
cultural. Sovereign debt, to the extent it represents inefficiencies or
'wrong' social, political or economic choices, must be minimized.
Castro's vision is far more sensitive to the consequences of a private
law lender-debtor analogy where public political power is involved.
Democracy is impossible in an economic system in which the democratic
order is subject to control by creditors and debtor states are made to
subsidize developed state wealth. Sovereign debt analogized to
corporate debt has a peculiar effect on the public or political function of
states as representatives of political communities. Debt conditions can
act as addendums to political constitutions. In effect, covenants and
conditions of state debt can modify the constitutional structure of nation-
states in effect if not in form. Economic policy power is effectively
diverted from the political community-the sovereign as the people of
the nation, to the creditors-lenders asserting a power to direct a core
function of sovereignty. Where the debtor is a corporation and the
ultimate sovereign the shareholders, subject to regulation by a political
community, this result is not problematic. However, where the debtor is
a state, and the ultimate sovereigns the citizens of that state, the result
appears to reduce the sovereign power of nations. A consequence: a
conflation of governance models for states and corporations fundamental
to the West is rejected by Castro as fundamentally incompatible with his
theory of the state as a public political body.
Castro's approach to sovereign debt, and the international financial
system of which it forms an integral part, may appear to be largely
irrelevant in a globe that has increasingly embraced the Washington
Consensus and its essentially private law, market and contract basis for
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economic relations, including relations between states and their creditors.
But Castro is more influential, at least at the margins, than he might
otherwise appear to be. The author has attempted to show the way
Castro's vision has become an important part of the normative base of
important segments of the international institutional community-and
principally of the United Nations Human Rights Commission community
in Geneva. The author has also suggested the many ways in which
Castro presents a secular version of an important religious perspective of
sovereign debt in the context of the international economic system in
which it is perpetuated.
The author by no means suggests that these views are correct, or
that the West and its financial institutions ought to change their behavior
necessarily on the basis of them. It is merely suggested that these views
are influential, and growing in importance among large segments of the
world community. Castro's ideas may not be original. Others might
have better developed the ideas that Castro has articulated. Castro
himself, unlike those sharing his views in the Vatican or in the United
Nations, might firmly believe that the ideas are inextricable from his own
Marxist-Leninist realities. For all that, his ideas ought to be taken
seriously by American policy makers. It is the author's belief that the
West will see a growing recourse to the rhetoric and ideas, the alternative
vision of global economic posited by Castro, in the coming decades. The
West had better be prepared to deal with these challenges if it intends to
defend and protect the system it has sought to put in place over the last
half a century.

